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PROCESS SCRUTINY: MOTIVATIONAL INQUIRY  




Judicial inquiries into political branch motivation have long bedeviled 
courts and scholars. Especially vexing are questions regarding judicial review of 
facially neutral government action. The canonical decision in this arena, 
Washington v. Davis, holds that facially neutral legislation or administrative action 
resulting in a disparate impact on the basis of race or gender will not on its own 
trigger heightened scrutiny.  In order to invoke more careful scrutiny of government 
action, there must be evidence of discriminatory intent. Many scholars understand 
the Court’s intent doctrine to license malintent by encouraging policymakers to 
conceal invidious purposes behind facially neutral language. For this reason, many 
argue that Davis is a low point for equal protection that fails to address the many 
forms of state-sponsored discrimination.   
This Article offers a different approach to motivational inquiries by 
examining how the political process itself can be an important site of information. 
Legislative and executive decision-making—or “small-p” process—can bear 
heavily on the question whether the government has acted properly or improperly. 
This idea of “small-p” process scrutiny stands in contradistinction to a more well-
established notion, famously articulated by process theorist John Hart Ely, that 
flaws within deliberative processes can invite, if not require, judicial protection of 
excluded interests. Ely’s classic rationale for heightened scrutiny was based upon 
the Constitution’s role in preserving accessibility to the political process—what I 
call “Big-P” process. Small-p processes, by contrast, concern more evident 
procedures, such as the quality or duration of deliberation, the involvement of 
experts, the facilitation of regular public hearings and open debate, or the 
documentation of studies and reasoning behind various policies. 
This Article seeks to overcome the difficulties of uncovering and 
operationalizing “Big-P” process failure by showing how a breakdown in more 
evident and easily detectable kinds of process failure can help bring to the surface 
forms of improper intent that are otherwise hard to see. I posit that courts can rely 
upon “small-p” indicia to decipher motivation, especially where there is no record 
of Big-P political failure or similar smoking-gun evidence of discrimination. By 
shifting the inquiry from interest-group dynamics in the legislative process to more 
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ordinary forms of process, I offer a method that is available to courts to surface 
malintent (or vindicate government intent) trans-substantively, and in ways already 
established in doctrine.  
One important advantage of a small-p process framework is that it is based 
less on substantive interpretations of value and intent—which can be highly 
contested and subjective—and more on objective criteria grounded in the political 
branches’ own chosen practices. Yet if process scrutiny offers powerful and 
revelatory indicators of governmental motivation, the theory also raises a number 
of concerns, including the risk of incentivizing or permitting an enacting body to 
camouflage other substantive deficiencies by simply meeting a bare minimum level 
of deliberative procedure, setting the stage for evasion.   
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Judicial inquiries into political branch motivation have long bedeviled 
courts and scholars.1 Especially vexing are questions regarding judicial review of 
facially neutral government action. The canonical decision in this arena, 
Washington v. Davis, holds that facially neutral legislation or administrative action 
resulting in a disparate impact on the basis of race or gender will not on its own 
trigger heightened scrutiny.2 In order to trigger more careful scrutiny of 
government action, there must be evidence of discriminatory intent. Many scholars 
understand the Court’s intent doctrine to license malintent by encouraging 
policymakers to conceal invidious purposes behind facially neutral language. For 
this reason, many argue that Davis is a low point for equal protection that fails to 
address the many forms of state-sponsored discrimination, not least because of the 
inherent difficulties discerning intent in such contexts.3  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 
1215 (2018) (observing that “the federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single definition 
of discriminatory intent, or a consistent approach to the evidentiary tools through which it 
is substantiated”); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 523, 528 (2016) (noting that Supreme Court cases display “varied 
approaches to the identification of legislative intent,” some of which are “wholly coherent” 
and others which “manifest ambiguity”). Importantly, Fallon’s critique of the Supreme 
Court’s intent jurisprudence is limited to the “peculiar problems posed by judicial inquiries 
into the intentions of multimember legislative bodies for the purpose of determining the 
validity of statutes or other policies,” not executive branch action. Id. at 530. See also 
Michael C. Dorf, Even A Dog: A Response to Professor Fallon, 130 HARV. L. REV. 86, 86 
(2016) (agreeing on the one hand that the Court’s doctrine on impermissible legislative 
intent is mostly unsatisfactory, while challenging Fallon’s decision to treat review of 
legislative action differently from executive and administrative action); Brandon L. 
Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1480 
(2018) (noting that “[i]ntent standards have practical limitations, and critics are right to 
point to difficulties in defining and proving intent” but they carry with it the “virtue of 
deterring extremely damaging conduct”). 
2 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (upholding an entrance exam for 
police officers in the District of Columbia that African-Americans tended to fail at higher 
rates than whites and refusing to apply more exacting scrutiny in the absence of compelling 
evidence of racially based motivation); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding that a town’s refusal to rezone a tract of 
land to allow for development of multi-family dwellings was not motivated by a racially 
discriminatory purpose or intent, despite the disparate impact the zoning decision had on 
the African-American population); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 
(1979) (upholding legislation in Massachusetts giving preference for veterans in civil 
service positions despite the law’s discriminatory impact on female applicants). 
3 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving 
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This Article offers a different approach to motivational inquiries by 
examining how the political process itself can be an important site of information. 
Legislative and executive decision-making—or “small-p” process—can bear 
heavily on the question whether the government has acted properly or improperly. 
This idea of “small-p” process scrutiny stands in contradistinction to a more well-
established notion, famously articulated by process theorist John Hart Ely, that 
flaws within deliberative processes can invite, if not require, judicial protection of 
excluded interests.4 Ely’s classic rationale for heightened scrutiny was based upon 
the Constitution’s role in preserving accessibility to the political process—what I 
call “Big-P” process.5 Small-p processes, by contrast, concern more evident 
                                                 
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (1997) (arguing that 
the intent doctrine comprises a larger body of case law formally ending substantive equality 
and is an illustration of how modern equal protection doctrine “no longer protects”); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 623 
(2015) (arguing “that the current Washington v. Davis and Feeney distinction between 
actuating and incidental intent has outlived any usefulness that it may ever have had”); 
Yvonne Elosiebo, Implicit Bias and Equal Protection: A Paradigm Shift, 42 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. SOC. CHANGE 451, 487 (2018) (arguing that because it is “nearly impossible . . . to prove 
discriminatory purpose in court, . . . Washington v. Davis should be overruled.”); Charles 
R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of 
"The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 944 (2008) (advancing 
“the more fundamental argument that Davis was wrong because the injury of racial 
inequality exists irrespective of the motives of the defendants in a particular case”). Cf. 
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (“If legislators 
have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like ‘race’ or the name of a 
particular racial group in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally apply 
ordinary rational basis review. This tendency is true even if the state action has an 
egregiously negative impact on a protected group.”); Bertrall L. Ross, The Representative 
Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 175 (2013) (arguing that the equal protection intent standard created has been applied 
inconsistently).  
4 See generally John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). 
5 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead – 
Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 685, 688 (1991) (defending the appropriateness of Carolene Products–style 
protection in the racial discrimination context, on the grounds that racial minorities have 
not achieved “full political equality”); Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and 
the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely Vs. Harlan 
Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 287 (1995) (contrasting the “process-based 
orientation” of Louis Lusky and Ely’s interpretation of Footnote Four with Stone’s view 
of the same as a statement of “the ‘preferred position’ of non-economic rights”); Pamela 
S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 
YALE L. J. 1329, 1332-33 (2005) (discussing Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory in 
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procedures, such as the quality or duration of deliberation, the involvement of 
experts, the facilitation of regular public hearings and open debate, or the 
documentation of studies and reasoning behind various policies.  
Though the elegance and power of Ely’s theory has ensured its rightful 
place in our constitutional canon,6 the theory has a blind spot—it cannot help us to 
see many forms of discrimination that are hidden from plain sight by more 
sophisticated lawmakers. In a world in which invidious discrimination easily hides 
behind facially neutral language, Ely’s theory provides little help for courts in 
determining whether a particular minority deserves representation-reinforcing 
judicial review. This Article seeks to overcome the difficulties of uncovering and 
operationalizing “Big-P” process failure by showing how a breakdown in more 
evident and easily detectable kinds of process failure can help bring to the surface 
forms of improper intent that are otherwise hard to see. I posit that courts can rely 
upon “small-p” indicia to decipher motivation, especially where there is no record 
of Big-P political failure or similar smoking-gun evidence of discrimination.7 By 
shifting the inquiry from interest-group dynamics in the legislative process to more 
ordinary forms of process, I offer a method that is available to courts to surface 
malintent (or vindicate government intent) trans-substantively, and in ways already 
established in doctrine.  
A number of recent cases provide powerful evidence that small-p 
procedures can provide a basis for enhanced judicial scrutiny on the one hand, or 
a vindicating mechanism on the other. From voter identification8 to LGBT rights,9 
                                                 
the context of legislative apportionment); Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political 
Process Theory through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1370-
72 (2011) (arguing for a doctrinal and conceptual “refashioning” of conventional process 
theory by examining it through the lens of the same-sex marriage debate). 
6 See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, The Importance of Being Elegant, 42 OHIO STATE L. 
J. 427, 430 (1981); Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA L. REV. 
641, 646 (1991) (“Ely’s argument is ingenious, elegant, and plausible.”); Jane S. Schacter, 
Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 Stan L. Rev. 737, 737 (2004) (“Ely’s elegant 
extrapolation of footnote four has profoundly affected my own thinking…”); Alan M. 
Dershowitz, In Memoriam: John Hart Ely, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2004) 
(describing Ely’s theory as “elegant in its simplicity though often complex in its 
application.”)  
7 Cf. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) 
(invalidating amendment to federal food stamp law based on smoking gun evidence that 
members of Congress “intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from 
participating in the food stamp program”). 
8 See infra notes 57-96 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying text. 
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from takings10 to affirmative action,11 and from national security12 to military 
personnel policies,13 courts rely on small-p process to analyze the legitimacy of 
government action. And the analysis can work in both directions. The 
government’s lack of procedural care can invite greater scrutiny and form a basis 
for invalidation. Or, conversely, where the government can demonstrate a thorough 
vetting method, reviewing courts sustain governmental action notwithstanding the 
otherwise questionable motives of government actors—and even go so far as 
remove the taint of improper motivation.  
Hawaii v. Trump is a paradigmatic example of both phenomena.14 In the 
aftermath of the travel ban’s first two iterations, lower courts anxious about 
striking down the law based on the President’s campaign statements routinely 
focused on small-p process, noting how the Executive’s lack of coordination, 
deliberation or consultation with agency experts lessened the case for deference.15 
On the other hand, by the time the third version of the ban reached the Supreme 
Court, Chief Justice Roberts could tout the Administration’s strong small-p 
                                                 
10 See infra notes 121-131 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 141-150 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 186-198 and accompanying text. 
14 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393 (2018).   
15 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601 (4th Cir. 2017), 
vacated and remanded sub nom., 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
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procedures, including a “comprehensive” and “worldwide” multi-agency review16 
as well as a robust waiver provision.17  
Ultimately, this Article lays the foundation for better understanding and 
application of discriminatory intent doctrine—a line of precedent that, while 
receiving tremendous scholarly attention,18 cannot be fully comprehended without 
a full grappling with, and accounting of, its underlying procedural roots. While the 
dynamic relationship between process failure and improper motive (or its close 
cousin, animus)19 finds some expression in the Court’s equal protection 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2404 (noting that the President “directed a worldwide 
review”); id. (describing temporary measures until “completion of the worldwide review”); 
id. at 2408 (“The President lawfully exercised [his] discretion based on his findings—
following a worldwide, multi-agency review—that entry of the covered aliens would be 
detrimental to the national interest.”); id. (the President ordered “DHS and other agencies 
to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the 
information and risk assessment baseline,” followed by “a Proclamation setting forth 
extensive findings describing how deficiencies in the practices of select foreign 
governments . . . deprive the Government of [information],” and concluded “that it was in 
the national interest to restrict entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate 
information—both to protect national security and public safety, and to induce 
improvement by their home countries.”); id. at 2412 (noting how “the multi-agency review 
process [determined] whether those high-risk countries provide a minimum baseline of 
information to adequately vet their nationals”); id. at 2421 (“The Proclamation, moreover, 
reflects the results of a worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials 
and their agencies.”). The government made repeated references to this process throughout 
the briefing, see, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 2, 5, 15, 16, 30, 58, 60, 63-66, Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965) and at the outset of oral argument before the 
Supreme Court. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct 2392 
(2018) (No. 17-965) (“Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: After a worldwide 
multi-agency review. . . .”). 
17 See Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2406 (noting “case-by-case waivers when a foreign national 
demonstrates undue hardship, and that his entry is in the national interest and would not 
pose a threat to public safety” and that “[t]he Proclamation further directs DHS to assess 
on a continuing basis whether entry restrictions should be modified or continued, and to 
report to the President every 180 days”); id. at 37 (noting that the Proclamation calls for 
continued assessments by DHS, periodic updates to the President and guidance to consular 
officials). See also Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45169 (Sept. 24, 2017) 
(establishing waiver program for, inter alia, foreign nationals who had previously been 
admitted to the United States for the purposes of work or study; those with “significant 
contacts” with the United States; those with “significant business or professional 
obligations”; close family members who are either lawful permanent residents or U.S. 
citizens; youth and those needing medical care; those employed by the government). 
18 See infra note 26. 
19 William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, ___ FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
[2019]) (manuscript at 39) (on file with author) (“[T]he Court’s animus jurisprudence has 
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jurisprudence—and in particular Justice Powell’s decision in Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation20—commentators 
have largely overlooked how procedural regularity can serve as a constitutional 
compass directing further judicial inquiry into the underlying intent of a given law 
or policy.21 Indeed, Powell’s process-based criteria provide especially helpful 
indicators in uncovering forms of discrimination that are often harder to see.22 And 
a number of recent cases support this Article’s thesis that the “due process of 
lawmaking”23 and governmental motivation are often perceived in lockstep 
fashion, a point that has special salience for novel rights claims.24  
One important advantage of a small-p process framework is that it is based 
less on substantive interpretations of value and intent—which can be highly 
contested and subjective—and more on objective criteria grounded in the political 
branches’ own chosen practices. Yet if process scrutiny offers powerful and 
revelatory indicators of governmental motivation, the theory also raises a number 
of concerns, including the risk of incentivizing or permitting an enacting body to 
camouflage other substantive deficiencies by simply meeting a bare minimum 
level of deliberative procedure, setting the stage for evasion.25 While “good 
                                                 
built upon the foundational statements of its discriminatory intent jurisprudence.”). 
20 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-69 (1977). 
21 Siegel, supra note 3 at 1134 (the court “continued to emphasize that plaintiffs might 
draw upon evidence of racial impact to prove a claim of discriminatory purpose” but after 
Feeney, the Court made clear that it had raised quite a formidable barrier to plaintiffs 
challenging facially neutral state action”); Haney-López, infra note 22, at 1814 (“The rise 
of colorblindness and malicious intent, however, destroyed the capacity of equal protection 
to actually protect non-Whites. In this account, Davis and contextual intent more generally 
suffer the fate of victims. It is a sad indicia of how far equal protection has devolved, that 
the villain of the 1970s is today’s honored dead.”). 
22 See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1130 (1998) 
(noting that the “evidentiary” approach codified in Arlington Heights enables courts to 
more deftly tread the “fine line” between deference and scrutiny); Ian F. Haney-López, 
Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1809, 1814-15 (2012) (arguing that, 
irrespective of what it and Davis have come to represent to both scholars and the Court 
itself, Arlington Heights “helpfully” established a framework through which “[c]ontextual 
intent” can aid courts’ efforts to discern racial discrimination). But cf. Yoshino, supra note 
3, at 764 (arguing that “in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court 
defined “discriminatory purpose” so stringently that it made all the evidentiary bases 
enumerated in Arlington Heights, including disparate impact, almost irrelevant”). 
23 See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). See 
also infra notes  
24 See infra Part V.B (discussing the implications of process scrutiny in the context of 
novel or peripheral rights claims). 
25 Cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” 
Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2835, 2839 (2009) (noting how procedural 
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process” need not be quantifiable, it should be objectively measurable to generate 
accountability.  
Following this Introduction, Part I lays out the baseline relationship 
between small-p process and the Supreme Court’s intent doctrine. Part II charts an 
evolution of a doctrine of process scrutiny in the context of legislation, focusing 
on Arlington Heights as well as a number of more contemporaneous examples. 
Part III demonstrates how the same dynamic of process scrutiny can be traced to 
judicial review of executive branch acts. Part IV explores the institutional 
dimensions of process scrutiny, including its institution- and issue-sensitive 
characteristics. Finally, Part V addresses normative implications, including the 
objective features of process scrutiny and its effect on emerging rights claims.  
 
I.  SMALL-P PROCESS AND INTENT: ESTABLISHING A BASELINE 
 
A.  The Relationship between Discriminatory Intent and Process Failure 
 
Courts understandably face great anxiety around questions of political 
branch motivation that no single device—procedural or otherwise—can entirely 
dispel. A familiar but fundamental difficulty with identifying improper 
governmental intent is whether it is even possible to aggregate the thoughts and 
motives of individual officials to produce a single governmental intent. This 
problem has been vigorously and fruitfully argued, particularly with regard to 
legislative intent. Some academics argue that such aggregation is sound in theory 
and workable in practice.26 Others argue by contrast that any attempt to discern 
                                                 
rulings allow for a situation in which “exactly the same law or practice that the Court had 
found objectionable would survive constitutional attack if political authorities, in a second 
go-round, avoided the initial process error”). 
26 See, e.g., RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 53 (2012) 
(providing an account of group intention as a collective expression of “we-intentions” held 
by individual legislators); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden 
Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 537 (2016) (“Despite well-known questions 
about whether Congress as a collective body can possess intentions or purposes, there are 
circumstances under which courts might coherently ascribe a collective intent to the 
legislature based on the intentions or motivations of individual legislators.”); see also Dorf, 
supra note 1, at 88-90 (arguing that Fallon’s analysis need not be limited to the legislative 
context, “as opposed to the broader relevance of intent in law”); see also Katherine Shaw, 
Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. __, 14-15 (forthcoming 2018) 
(observing that that discerning illegitimate intent in the executive context should be much 
more straightforward as an evidentiary matter given the lack of aggregation and is in fact 
already routine in judicial review); but cf. Huq, supra note 1, at 1286 (arguing that 
discriminatory intent challenges lose force as the context shifts from legislative action to 
dispersed executive discretion, due in part to the case-by-case decisional approach 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403723 
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legislative intent via aggregation is conceptually incoherent and thus doomed to 
failure.27 Ronald Dworkin, for instance, famously argued that even a 
preternaturally gifted judge would run into insurmountable difficulties trying to 
discover the intent of a legislature.28 This divide is also reflected in federal court 
precedent,29 including the Supreme Court’s failed experiment to dispense with 
motivational analysis in constitutional adjudication.30 
The difficulties of engaging in an intent-based analysis are often 
compounded by the heavily fact-dependent nature of legislative intent. As Richard 
Fallon has pointed out, legislative intent is a “protean concept,” inevitably colored 
by the particular fact pattern it inhabits.31 As a result, the judicial approach to 
identifying improper legislative intent is commonly described as inconsistent and 
problematic across different cases and contexts.32 Indeed, in William Araiza’s 
phrase, the “epistemological difficulty [of deciphering intent] would seem to send 
a strong cautionary signal about widespread use of the animus idea.”33 
Indeed, the presumption that one can know with certainty the internal 
attitudes, emotions and biases of a single person, let alone an entire legislative 
body, places on judges, in all but the most flagrant instances, a demand to be mind-
                                                 
characteristic of executive actors). 
27 See Steven Douglas Smith, Against Civil Rights Simplism: How Not to 
Accommodate Competing Legal Commitments 7 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 17-
294, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991883 
(“arguments that centrally turn on ascriptions of animus to large classes of people are likely 
at best to vastly oversimplify a complex set of beliefs, perspectives, and motivations.”). 
28 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 317-33 (1986) (detailing the struggles of 
determining which legislators’ intentions count, how these intentions combine, which 
mental states count as intentions, and how to deal with conflicting intentions); see also 
Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (“If legislative purpose is the mere aggregation of the motivations of 
individual legislation, then there seems to be no escaping the conclusion that the very idea 
of legislative purpose is incoherent.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure 
in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive 
for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”). 
29 See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1785, 
1795-857 (2008) (providing an account of the growing acceptance over time of judicial 
inquiry into legislative purpose). 
30 See supra note 2. 
31 Fallon, supra note 1, at 553.  
32 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 1, at 1211 (arguing that the Supreme Court has not 
provided a “crisp, single definition of ‘discriminatory intent’ that applies across institutions 
and public policy contexts”); Fallon, supra note 1, at 528 (observing that the Supreme 
Court “has failed to settle on a single, intelligible conception of legislative intent”).  
33 Araiza, supra note 19, at 24-25. 
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readers.34 Such a role imposes an impossible expectation fraught with numerous 
problems—requiring subjective judgment about the internal beliefs, attitudes and 
intentions of others that exists outside a legislative or policy document; 
determining if the degree of influence of those divined attitudes and biases 
constitutes animus; and so forth. Furthermore, such an expectation demands that 
judges be indefensibly reductive—reducing not only an individual’s thoughts and 
attitudes to a single intent, but that of an entire legislative body.35 For these reasons, 
an objective approach, in which judicial review is couched in the broader context 
and process of a given policy, may provide courts with a useful lens that avoids 
resorting to entirely subjective impressions or a psychoanalysis of the minds of the 
lawmakers themselves.36  
The emerging doctrine of “process scrutiny” provides such a framework. 
On the one hand, process scrutiny holds government institutions to their own 
standard, rather than creating a new one; on the other hand, the framework has the 
potential to aid courts in seeing forms of discrimination that are ordinarily less 
visible. 
 
B.  Process Scrutiny and the Court’s Intent Standard 
 
The connection between procedural scrutiny and governmental intent 
dates back to Justice Stone’s famous footnote four in Carolene Products noting 
how certain defects in the process of law-making could require stricter judicial 
scrutiny and a narrowing of the usual presumption of constitutionality.37 Forty 
years later, the Warren Court’s process-oriented activism in fields such as criminal 
procedure, political expression and equal protection inspired John Hart Ely’s 
seminal exposition of the ideas modestly advanced in Carolene Products.38 Ely 
                                                 
34 See U.S. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (describing divining legislative intent from legislative history as 
“psychoanalysis of Congress” and being “handicapped in that weird endeavor” because the 
“process seems to [be] not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute”); Wisconsin 
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with 
Justice Jackson’s characterization). 
 
36 Cf. McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 
(2005) (warning against “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts”). 
37 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court indicated 
three categories of legislation that might require more robust judicial intervention: 
legislation that facially falls within a specific constitutional prohibition; legislation 
restricting political processes that cause undesirable legislation to be repealed; and 
legislation curtailing political processes relied upon to protect discrete and insular 
minorities. See id. at 152 n.4. See also Ely, supra note 4, at 73-75. 
38 Ely found in the Warren Court’s constitutional decisions a “deep structure” that was 
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drew on Carolene Products to describe the Equal Protection Clause as a 
mechanism to vindicate access to the political process so that all groups can take 
part in the benefits of representative government.39 In Democracy and Distrust, 
Ely offered a methodical account of how the Constitution is “overwhelmingly 
dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the identification and 
preservation of specific substantive values.”40 This meant that the Court should be 
concerned with participation, not on identifying and protecting substantive values. 
When the political process has been restricted in some way, the Court must 
intervene to unclog the channels of access.41  
Although Ely believed that heightened judicial scrutiny would effectively 
smoke out improper legislative motivation,42 his theory does not provide much 
clarity regarding the appropriate use of that level of scrutiny. He argues that 
heightened scrutiny is warranted only when a law burdens a “suspect 
classification”43 and that the real linchpin for determining suspect classifications 
should be the presence of prejudice.44 Yet he does not explain how a court would 
know whether a given law is founded on prejudice in the first place. This is a 
problem because, assuming that lawmakers have the ability to hide improper 
motivation behind facially neutral laws, and given a broader judicial reluctance to 
                                                 
neither clause-bound nor value-oriented, but instead “participational.” Ely, supra note 4, 
at 73-75. For Ely, these decisions evinced two main concerns: “clearing the channels of 
political change” and “correcting certain kinds of discrimination against minorities.” Id. 
39 Ely, supra note 4, at 74-75. 
40 Id. at 92. Ely links this constitutional commitment to process to paragraphs two and 
three of Carolene Products’ famous footnote four. The second paragraph suggests that the 
appropriate function of the Court is “to make sure the channels of political participation 
and communication are kept open.” Id. at 76. The third paragraph “suggests that the Court 
should also concern itself with what majorities do to minorities.” Id. Ely thinks these two 
concerns fit together and demonstrate the principal concern of the Warren Court:  that 
everyone have access to the political process to take part in the benefits of representative 
government. Id. at 74-75. 
41 Id. at 77. 
42 Ely cautions against looking to lawmakers’ motivations in cases of outright 
constitutional violations because in those cases the constitutional violation is enough to 
warrant striking down the legislation regardless of the motivations of the lawmakers. Thus, 
he argues that judicial exploration of lawmakers’ motivations is only appropriate when 
there is a claim that a “constitutionally gratuitous” benefit has been improperly withheld. 
Id. at 145. In cases “where what is denied is something [to which] the claimant has a 
constitutional right—because it is granted explicitly by the terms if the Constitution or is 
essential to the effective functioning of a democratic government (or both)—the reasons it 
was denied are irrelevant.” Id.   
43 Id at 145-46. 
44 Id. at 153. 
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afford heightened scrutiny to many “new” equal protection claimants,45 Ely’s 
representation reinforcement may make it hard to uncover forms of discrimination 
that may go underground or otherwise be harder to see.  
Four years before Ely famously emphasized the Constitution’s role in 
guarding the accessibility of the political process by examining the function of 
process at the macro level, the eminent Judge and scholar Hans Linde penned a 
seminal article about procedural review focusing on micro-level procedures.46 
Linde was especially critical of cases such as United States Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno47 that applied more searching forms of rational basis review. 
Under this new and dangerous model of judicial review, courts would bring to 
balance “competing needs and ideals” and, only then, “relate[] the conclusion to 
phrases in the Constitution when possible.”48 For Linde, this got the whole point 
of judicial review backwards: rather than make substantive value judgments about 
“legislative purposes or their relative weights,”49 courts could look examine the 
legislative means and engage a second-order question of “instrumental 
rationality.” 
Linde focused on smaller-scale rules (arguably, small-p procedures) that 
legislative bodies imposed on their internal activities.50 These could be rules 
governing deliberation and voting, budgeting restrictions, scheduling, 
reapportionment or the structuring of committees.51 While The Due Process of 
Lawmaking did not draw explicit connections between process and legislative 
motivation,52 shortly thereafter Supreme Court decisions began to link 
unconstitutional motivation and procedural irregularity. After a brief period in the 
early 1970s when the Supreme Court appeared to dispense with intent-based 
inquiries altogether in constitutional analysis,53 motivational analysis soon took 
center stage in major constitutional interpretations of equal protection.54 And those 
                                                 
45 See supra note 27.  
46 See generally, Linde, supra note 23.   
47 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id., at 241-42. 
51Id., at 242. 
52 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
53 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (overruling constitutional challenge to 
decision by Jackson, Mississippi, to close down its pools rather than integrate them), 
54 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding an entrance exam 
for police officers in the District of Columbia that African-Americans tended to fail at 
higher rates than whites in the absence of compelling evidence that the motivation behind 
the law was racially based).  See also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-
81 (1979); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 
(1977). 
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subsequent decisions have focused less on the kind of deliberative and 
participatory failures Ely had in mind, and more on the kinds of small-p process 
Linde had in mind. The result was an important, if incomplete, doctrinal 
relationship between deviations in small-p process and governmental motivation. 
 
II. THE HIDDEN LEGACY OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS 
 
The connection between small-p process failure and improper motivation 
finds important expression in the “discriminatory intent” cases of the 1970s. When 
the Court in Washington v. Davis55 established that the disparate racial impact of a 
law would generally not, without more, trigger the same exacting scrutiny as 
explicit classifications, it was not completely blind to the difficulty its intent 
standard might place on equal protection litigators. Thus, Davis allowed that the 
Court could infer an improper motivation from the surrounding circumstances and 
context of a given governmental policy.56 The Court’s “totality of the facts” 
language left an open door to more substantial methods of scrutiny than ephemeral 
attempts to divine intent.  
 
A.  Arlington Heights’ Quiet Strain of Proceduralism 
 
One year after Davis was decided, the Court drew on the intent standard 
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation, sustaining a town’s denial of a proposed rezoning effort that would 
produce racially integrated housing units.57 Although Powell refused to consider 
evidence of racial impact as tantamount to an express racial classification, he 
affirmed Davis’s recognition that the Court should look at the “totality of the facts” 
to infer motivation from the surrounding circumstances and context of a given 
governmental policy.58 Powell also went further to articulate a list of 
considerations that could be probative of discriminatory intent.  
Powell non-exhaustive list59 describes those elements a court can use to 
discern intent. The list clearly includes procedural and non-procedural factors, with 
                                                 
55 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
56 Id. at 242 (“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts, including [that] the law bears more heavily on one 
race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact. . . may for 
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the 
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.”). 
57 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 256. 
58 Id. at 266 (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available.”). 
59 Id. at 268 (noting that the list of “subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether 
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some falling at the intersection of process and substance. But certain key factors 
are unambiguous and a clear invitation to examine government process as part of 
an intent-based inquiry of relevant factors largely based on procedural analysis. 
Thus, while Powell focused on the historical background of a given policy, which 
might reveal “a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes”60 or “the 
specific sequence of events” leading up to a given act,61 one factor stands out from 
Powell’s list as affirmatively inviting a baseline oriented procedural analysis: that 
“departures from normal procedur[e] [] might afford evidence that improper 
purposes are playing a role.”62 And the centrality of small-p process has become 
apparent as courts in a variety of contexts have relied on Powell’s procedural 
benchmarks to ferret out improper motivation. 
 
1. Arlington Heights’ Application in the Voter ID Cases 
 
The procedural features of Powell’s framework have been highly 
influential in a number of voter identification decisions. While the cases raise 
evident concerns about the very exclusionary practices that were of concern to 
Ely,63 courts have routinely resorted to an analysis of small-p process to strike 
down the laws in question. Two recent cases, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP 
v. McCrory64 and Veasey v. Abbott,65 are illustrative of how courts’ difficulty 
actualizing certain aspects of representation reinforcement have not eliminated the 
possibility of meaningful judicial review altogether. The decisions are remarkable 
for how they link motivational inquiry with the kinds process concerns that Powell 
identified in Arlington Heights.  
 
a. NAACP and Small-p Process 
 
After Shelby County v. Holder invalidated the Voting Rights Act’s 
preclearance regime,66 states unleashed punishing new voter ID restrictions67 that 
                                                 
racially discriminatory intent existed” did not “purport[] to be exhaustive”). 
60 Id. at 267  
61 Id. 
62 Id. Powell also also mentioned “[s]ubstantive departures” and “the relevant 
legislative or administrative history.” See id. at 267-68.  
63 Cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
64 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). 
65 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612. 
66 133 S. Ct 2612, 2651 (2013). Shelby County officially retired the formula previously 
used to determine which districts required preclearance under the Voting Rights Act and 
freed many states and counties from having to submit proposed changes in voting laws to 
the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel.   
67 Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy:  The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
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were challenged on both statutory and constitutional grounds.68 In  North Carolina, 
the legislature abruptly passed an “omnibus” voting reform law69 that reduced the 
list of acceptable forms of photo identification for in-person voting,70 eliminated 
same-day registration and preregistration for individuals age 16 and 17,71 reduced 
the number of early voting days from 17 to ten72 and scrapped a provisional voting 
process for out-of-precinct voting.73 In North Carolina State Conference of 
NAACP v. McCrory, the Fourth Circuit, applying Arlington Heights, permanently 
enjoined the challenged provisions as intentionally discriminatory under both 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act74 and the Fourteenth Amendment.75    
The Fourth Circuit did not ignore substantive concerns about racial 
discrimination and voter disenfranchisement, from “the inextricable link between 
race and politics in North Carolina”76 to the legislature’s curious interest in 
addressing voter fraud at the very moment when African-American voter turnout 
in North Carolina was, after decades of setbacks, finally reaching near-parity with 
that of the white population.77 Yet the court ultimately resolved the case on 
                                                 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 57, 90 (2017) (noting that Shelby County “clear[ed] the way for partisan legislatures 
in the South…to reassert their control over voting rules”); Mark Rush, The Current State 
of Election Law in the United States, 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383, 409-
10 (2017) (explaining that Shelby County “unleashed state legislatures to restrict access to 
polling stations on Election Day”). 
68 Carroll Rhodes, Federal Appellate Courts Push Back Against States’ Voter 
Suppression Laws, 85 MISS. L.J. 1227, 1248 (2017) (explaining how the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Circuits have invalidated voter suppression laws that were enacted on the heels of 
Shelby County). 
69 Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1505 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of N.C. Gen. Stat.).   
70 See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir. 
2016). 
71 See id. at 217-18. 
72 See id. at 217. 
73 See id. 
74 Pub. L. No. 89-110, §2, 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. 
§10301(a)). 
75 NAACP, 831 F.3d at 219, 241. 
76 Id. at 214. Judge Motz, writing for the court, noted that voting in North Carolina had 
become so “racially polarized,” with different races traditionally voting for different 
political parties, that it was possible for members of the legislature to enact laws “targeting 
[racial] groups unlikely to vote for them.” Id. See also id. at 226 (noting that “contextual 
facts, which reveal the powerful undercurrents influencing North Carolina politics, must 
be considered in determining why the General Assembly enacted [the legislation]”). 
77 See id. at 214, 226 (“[T]he General Assembly enacted [the rules] in the immediate 
aftermath of unprecedented African American voter participation in a state with a troubled 
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procedural grounds, engaging in a painstaking application of the Arlington Heights 
factors. Noting how “‘[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence’ may 
demonstrate “that improper purposes are playing a role,” the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the trial court “erred in refusing to draw the obvious inference that 
th[e] sequence of events signals discriminatory intent.”78 
Indeed, examples of “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” 
were rife. First was the issue of timing: the voter ID provisions were announced 
the day after Shelby County removed the very preclearance requirement that would 
have likely prevented those provisions from becoming law.79 The Fourth Circuit 
saw this as suspicious under Arlington Heights’ instruction to consider the 
“specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision.”80 Furthermore, 
rather than introduce the voting rules as part of a new, stand-alone bill, the General 
Assembly simply tacked them onto existing legislation that already bore the 
features of ordinary law, “swiftly expand[ing] an essentially single-issue bill into 
omnibus legislation”—a clear departure from procedural norms.81  
While the pre-Shelby County version of the bill received three weeks of 
public debate and had even garnered some bipartisan support, that bill sat dormant 
for two months while Shelby County loomed and was not revisited until the Court 
excised the preclearance procedure from the Voting Rights Act.82 The new post-
Shelby County bill was three times as long as the original bill83 and “rushed . . . 
through the legislative process”84 without being marked up by a committee85—
again, a clear indication of procedurally anomalous conduct. The court went on to 
observe that “neither this legislature—nor, as far as we can tell, any other 
legislature in the Country—has ever done so much, so fast, to restrict access to the 
franchise.”86 By interpreting the government’s motivation through the prism of 
small-p procedure, the court was able to find malintent.87 
                                                 
racial history and racially polarized voting.”). The court also explained that well over 85% 
of African Americans voted for Democratic candidates in the two previous presidential 
elections. See id. at 226. 
78 Id. at 227 (internal citations omitted).  
79 See id. at 214.  
80 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977). 
81 Id. at 216. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 228. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 228. 
87 Indeed, there were other indications in McCrory that pointed more directly to 
invidious intent—in particular the legislature’s request for racial data. With each data point 
the legislature received, a new provision was added, amended or removed, but all seemed 
to have the same purpose: disenfranchising African American voters. See id. at 216-18. For 
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b. Veasey and Small-p Process 
 
In Veasey v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit linked small-p process with improper 
motivation, striking down a pre-Shelby County voter ID law known as Senate Bill 
14 (“SB-14”)88 that prohibited many standard forms of identification permitted in 
other states.89 The Fifth Circuit did not ignore substantive concerns such as Texas’s 
history of all-white primaries, literacy tests, secret ballots and poll taxes,90 yet it 
deemed those practices too distant to evince improper intent within the current 
law.91 On the other hand, where small-p process was concerned, “numerous and 
radical procedural departures [gave] credence to an inference of discriminatory 
intent.”92  These included:  
 
                                                 
example, the original bill permitted the use of all government-issued identification; when 
the racial data revealed that African Americans were less likely to possess certain types of 
identification, the new bill was amended to permit only those types of identification 
African Americans carried less frequently. See id. at 216. When lawmakers learned that 
African Americans predominantly utilized early voting procedures, the legislature curbed 
that provision, shortening early voting by a full week. See id. The law also limited same-
day registration and out-of-province voting, two mechanisms the district court found were 
also utilized disproportionately by African Americans. See id. at 217-18. 
88 See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (allowing drivers’ 
licenses, personal identification cards, military identification cards, U.S. citizenship 
certificates, U.S. passports, licenses to carry a concealed handgun, or Election 
Identification Certificates, provided these forms of ID were issued by the proper agency 
and have not been expired for more than sixty days). 
89 SB-14 as deemed was deemed the “strictest” voting law in the country. See Veasey 
v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 642 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in 
part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Veasey v. Abbott, 
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/case/veasey-v-abbott-0 
(last updated April 27, 2018). Under SB-14, for example, one may not use state 
identification from a state other than Texas, public assistance identification, student 
identification, or any federal government identification not enumerated in the law. See 
Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (listing the acceptable and unacceptable forms of ID under 
SB-14). 
90 The initial district judge found the law was enacted with discriminatory purpose, 
Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 633, and the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, largely sustained that 
ruling. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 272 (remanding certain aspects of the lower court’s analysis for 
clarification). 
91 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 232. The court also found that the more recent instances of 
discrimination cited in the district court record were simply less probative of an intent by 
the legislature to discriminate. Id. at 233. 
92 Id. at 238. 
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(1) getting special permission to file the bill under a low number reserved 
for the Lieutenant Governor’s legislative priorities; (2) Governor Perry’s 
decision to designate the bill as emergency legislation so that it could be 
considered during the first sixty days of the legislative session; (3) 
suspending the two-thirds rule regarding the number of votes required to 
make SB 14 a “special order”; (4) allowing the bill to bypass the ordinary 
committee process in the Texas House and Senate; (5) passing SB 14 with 
an unverified $2 million fiscal note despite the prohibition on doing so in 
the 2011 legislative session due to a $27 million budget shortfall; (6) 
cutting debate short to enable a three-day passage through the Senate; and 
(7) passing resolutions to allow the conference committee to add 
provisions to SB 14, contrary to the Legislature’s rules and normal 
practice. . . . 93 
 
The court was equally troubled by the legislature’s decision, despite its awareness 
of the disproportionate impact the law would have on historically marginalized 
groups, to reject additional proposals to curb that impact. Tying this to small-p 
process scrutiny, the Court noted that the law’s proponents “largely refused to 
explain the rejection of those amendments,”94 something that “was out of character 
for sponsors of major bills.”95  These procedural irregularities contributed to the 
Fifth Circuit sustaining the lower court’s finding of improper motivation.96  
 Veasey is a powerful example of how small-p scrutiny can shore up gaps 
in traditional intent doctrine. A pure “intent” analysis would have been insufficient 
under Davis and its progeny because of the difficulty proving that the legislature 
acted “because of, and not merely in spite of,” the disproportionate impact.97 Still, 
                                                 
93 Id. at 238 (citations omitted).  The court went on to note that these procedural 
oddities were only present with regard to SB-14; none of the other pressing legislation 
received the same special treatment. See id. 
94 Id. at 237. 
95 Id. (citations omitted). 
96 Id. at 239. NAACP and Veasey reveal a related point about process failure and 
improper motivation that is worthy of mention. In both cases, the courts were explicit that 
any purportedly legitimate justification for a problem that the court concludes is fabricated 
quickly loses legs, creating the space for a finding of improper motivation. In NAACP, for 
example, the Fourth Circuit accused the North Carolina legislature of manufacturing a 
phony narrative for its voter ID law, “impos[ing] cures for problems that [do] not exist,” 
831 F.3d at 214, while in Veasey, the Fifth Circuit called out the legislature for ignoring its 
procedures for the sake of addressing an “almost nonexistent problem.” 830 F.3d at 239. 
See also Joseph Landau, Broken Records: Reconceptualizing Rational Basis Review to 
Address “Alternative Facts” in the Legislative Process, 73 VAND. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2020).  
97 See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) 
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the Court could draw on the vast procedural irregularities of SB-14 to help surface 
the underlying discriminatory intent.  
 
2. Beyond Arlington Heights: Process Scrutiny and Judicial Invalidation 
 
In addition to NAACP and Veasey, lower courts have drawn on small-p 
process concerns to allow suits to proceed beyond preliminary stages of litigation 
and even enjoin policies concerning school desegregation,98 fair housing and land 
use,99 the dormant commerce clause,100 electoral redistricting and allocation of 
public benefits.101 Those courts have invoked Arlington Heights’ multi-factor test, 
finding improper motive based on a lack of procedural regularity in government 
decision-making. For example, an Arizona district court recently set aside a 
facially neutral state law that prohibited ethnic studies courses by finding the 
policy’s enactment and enforcement to be motivated by improper motivation.102 In 
addition to derogatory statements made by legislators, the court relied on 
irregularities in the process of enactment.103 Beyond evidence of discriminatory 
                                                 
(requiring a showing that the government acted “because of, not merely in spite of” 
discriminatory impact to apply heightened scrutiny). 
98 See Stout ex rel. Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 2018). 
99 See Ave. 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 509 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 295 (2016); Pac. Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport 
Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013); Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 
FL, 529 F.3d 1027, 1044 (11th Cir. 2008); Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. United 
States Dep’t of Treasury, No. 3:14-CV-3013-D, 2016 WL 6397643, (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 
2016); MHANY Mgmt. Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016); 
Hidden Vill., LLC v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 867 F. Supp. 2d 920 (N.D. Ohio 2012), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 734 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2013); Church of Scientology of Georgia, 
Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
100 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, No. 1:15-CV-
134-RP, 2018 WL 1404409 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2018). 
101 See, e.g., Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
102 See Gonzalez v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948 (D. Ariz. 2017). The Tucson Unified 
School District’s Mexican-American Studies program was borne out of a desegregation 
decree and aimed to engage Mexican-American students in their schoolwork by 
highlighting aspects of Mexican-American history and culture. Id. at 950-51. When Tucson 
school officials tried to end the program, the court held that Arizona school officials acted 
with racial animus. Id. at 973; see also Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 981 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that there is “sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the enactment and/or enforcement of [the state law] § 15–112 here challenged was 
motivated, at least in part, by an intent to discriminate against [] students on the basis of 
their race or national origin)”.   
103 See Gonzalez, 269 F. Supp 3d at 965-68. 
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intent in enactment, the court pointed to procedural irregularities like reliance on 
one-sided investigations as evidence of discriminatory intent in enforcement.104 
And in litigation challenging an Alabama voter ID law, a federal district court 
looked to procedural irregularity—that, among other things, the time for debating 
the bill had been severely constrained—as sufficient evidence of discriminatory 
motive to survive a motion to dismiss.105 Finally, in challenges to newly enacted 
electoral maps, departures from normal procedures in the events prior to 
enactment—including intentional constraints on debate and violations of rules for 
public hearings—was sufficient for a Texas district court to find that the City of 
Pasadena, Texas, had enacted an unconstitutional electoral map with a 
discriminatory intent to dilute Latino votes.106 
 
B.  Process Scrutiny and Legislative Vindication 
 
Process scrutiny works in both directions: while courts might treat with greater 
scrutiny legislative acts that undermine well-established procedures, they might 
also give leeway to otherwise suspect policy choices that are the result of a 
thorough vetting. Indeed, Washington v. Davis itself could conceivably stand as an 
example.107 Although the challenged entrance exam for applicants to the D.C. 
Police Department had a disparate racial impact on African-American applicants, 
the police force had made extensive efforts to diversify.108 Not only did the police 
force make “affirmative efforts . . . to recruit black officers,”109 but record evidence 
supported the government’s claim that the exam was directly related to the training 
needs and requirements of the police force.110 Indeed, the extensive expert 
testimony fleshed out a relatively robust small-p process. In briefing, Corporation 
Counsel relied on studies by numerous experts to support the claim that the 
entrance exam was a reasonable, impartial, and objective predictive tool to 
establish ability to be trained. This included a study by the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission and affidavits from research psychologists and other educational 
                                                 
104 Id. at 968-70.    
105 See Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1245 (N.D. 
Ala. 2017).  However the defendant, Secretary of State John Merrill, did ultimately prevail 
against the plaintiff’s constitutional claims on his motion for summary judgment. See 
Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2018). 
106 Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
107 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
108 Id. at 235 (noting that the D.C. Police Department “had systematically and 
affirmatively sought to enroll black officers” and that “44% of new police force recruits 
had been black” in the years immediately preceding the litigation. 
109 Id. at 246. 
110 Id. at 251.  
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testing experts.111 Other authorities bolstered that evidence by noting the “need for 
police recruits to possess the verbal ability to be trained which Test 21 is designed 
to measure.”112 Given this broader context—one bearing little to no trace of 
irregularity, and one in which  the plaintiffs affirmatively disclaimed any allegation 
of discriminatory motivation113—the Court concluded that the “changing racial 
composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, and the relationship 
of the test to the training program negated any inference that the Department 
discriminated on the basis of race or that a police officer qualifies on the color of 
his skin rather than ability.”114  
The 1981 case Rostker v. Goldberg also illustrates the vindicating potential of 
small-p process.115 Rostker upheld the constitutionality of an all-male selective 
service policy under heightened scrutiny.116 The Court rested heavily on the 
extensive nature of Congress’s deliberations,117 including robust debate over 
female inclusion through “extensive[] . . . hearings, floor debate, and in 
committee.”118 Based on those rigorous procedures, the Court satisfied itself that 
the resulting act was not a product of outmoded or “‘traditional way[s] of thinking 
about females.’”119 Importantly, Rostker did not defer flatly to the military’s 
judgment on matters of personnel, instead scaling deference according to 
procedural rigor—an evaluation of “how the political branches [] made the policy 
choice at issue.”120   
                                                 
111 Walter E. Washington, et al., Petitioners, v. Alfred E. Davis, et al., Respondents., 
1975 WL 173557 (U.S.), 6. 
112 Id. at 18. The authorities cited are judicial and administrative, including 
observations from the Executive Director of the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police and reports by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice. Id. at 19-21. 
113 426 U.S. at 251. 
114 Davis, 426 U.S at 247 (internal citaions and quotation marks omitted) . 
115 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
116 Id. at 69. 
117 Id. at 72-74. 
118 Id. The Court elaborated on the extent of hearings within both chambers of 
Congress, noting in particular how the Senate “defeated, after extensive debate, an 
amendment which in effect would have authorized the registration of women.” Id. 
119 Id. at 74. These extensive deliberations gave the Court confidence that Congress 
was not acting “unthinkingly or reflexively and not for any considered reason.” Id. at 72-
74 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222-23 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). In 
Califano, the court held that “a rule which effects an unequal distribution of economic 
benefits solely on the basis of sex” was grounded in “habit” or an “automatic reflex” 
regarding traditional gender norms “rather than analysis or actual reflection.” Califano, 
430 U.S. at 222-23. 
120 See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV 2188, 
2260 (2018). Indeed, after Rostker, a number of lower courts upheld the U.S. military’s 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403723 
13-Jun-19]                              Process Scrutiny        21 
 
The 2005 Supreme Court case Kelo v. City of New London illustrates a 
similar use of process scrutiny to validate government decision-making in the very 
different context of unconstitutional takings.121 Kelo arose out of a decision by the 
City Council of New London, Connecticut,122 authorizing the purchase or 
acquisition of property by the exercise of eminent domain as part of an initiative 
to redevelop an economically depressed neighborhood.123 When a group of 
property owners challenged the policy as an improper taking under the Fifth 
Amendment,124 Kelo upheld the city’s unusual use of eminent domain to spur 
economic development by crediting the “thorough deliberation” preceding the 
municipality’s “carefully considered” development plan.125 Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence also noted how New London’s integrated plan, based on “elaborate 
                                                 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding gay, lesbian and bisexual servicemembers by 
noting the political branches’ “extensive examination” of the policy they later adopted. See 
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F. 3d 915, 922 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). This included a military 
working group, a commissioned study by the RAND Corporation, as well as “regular 
consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and leaders of each service, . . . [close study of] 
the history of the military’s response to social change, and consult[ation] [with] legal 
experts.” Renan, supra note 120, at 2261. These “exhaustive efforts of the democratically 
accountable branches of American government,” the court of appeals stressed, “is precisely 
[why] they deserve judicial respect.” Thomasson, 80 F. 3d at 923. Although these decisions 
turned on deference to the Executive, rather than to Congress, in the context of military 
affairs, the Court gives substantial weight to either of the political branches, provided it 
demonstrates a sound process.  
121 Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005).   
122 Id. at 473-75. New London acted through its legislature to create a private nonprofit 
entity called the New London Development Corporation (NLDC) that would lead the 
planning process and seek state regulatory approvals on the city’s behalf. See id. at 473. 
The NLDC negotiated with private land owners to purchase most of the property that was 
subject to the redevelopment plan.  Those who did not consent to selling their land, like the 
plaintiffs, had their land condemned and acquired by eminent domain. Id. at 474. When 
NLDC’s plan was fully approved, the City Council designated NLDC to act as its agent 
and delegated the city’s eminent domain power.  Id. at 475. 
123 Throughout its opinion, the Supreme Court explicitly treats the city and NLDC as 
interchangeable, referring to both as acting in a legislative capacity. See id. at 480 
(deferring to the City in light of “our longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments”); id. at 483 (noting that the Court “afford[s] legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power”); id. at 489 (deferring 
to the City’s judgment about the development plan in light of “the discretion of the 
legislative branch” on such matters); see also Connecticut Home Rule Act, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 7-199 (2013) (stipulating that any municipality “shall have the power to (1) adopt 
and amend a charter which shall be its organic law”). 
124 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. 
125 Id. at 483-84. 
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procedural requirements,” alleviated concerns that such takings would be abused 
or put to “suspicious use,” benefiting only private interests.126 
Although the invocation of eminent domain for public use is 
constitutionally legitimate and generally uncontroversial, it can be divisive 
because of equity concerns such takings can engender.127 And the Kelo decision 
was not without political backlash.128 Indeed, some scholars have resolved those 
concerns by associating Kelo with Ely’s theory of representation reinforcement.129 
From the standpoint of process scrutiny, however, deference in Kelo is based less 
on protecting interests that might otherwise have been excluded from the ordinary 
workings of politics and more about sound small-p procedures.130 Thus, even as 
Kelo provides a broad interpretation of the “public purpose” doctrine that affords 
“legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the 
takings power,”131 the careful, deliberative process in the record provided an 
important basis for deference.  
                                                 
126 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
127 See Nestor Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV 1, 5 
(2008) (discussing the theoretical and jurisprudential problems of analyzing equality 
claims within the takings doctrine and arguing that instead they should “sound . . . under 
the Equal Protection Clause”).  
128 See Ilya Somin, The story behind Kelo v. City of New London – how an obscure 
takings case got to the Supreme Court and shocked the nation, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(May 29, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelo-case-how-an-obscure-takings-case-
came-to-shock-the-conscience-of-the-nation/?utm_term=.8f9e13380235. 
129 See Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and Representation 
Reinforcement in the Public Use Debate, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 375 (2008) (“[T]he Kelo Court 
signaled that, at least within this one area of substantive law, it had moved toward the 
school of constitutional interpretation known as “representation reinforcement.”). 
130 While Justice Stevens deferred to the majoritarian political process as bearing the 
trappings of legitimacy, Justice O’Connor’s dissent identified failings not only in the 
exclusion of certain interests from the political process but also the majority’s test for 
ferreting out takings that were exclusively for private benefit. Kelo, 454 U.S. at 502-04. 
Justice O’Connor found that the political process was captured by the beneficiaries of the 
plan—namely, “those citizens with disproportionate influence and power”—to the 
exclusion of those with fewer resources. Id. at 505.  Moreover, the dissent warns that the 
majority’s deferential test, which allows any secondary public benefit to satisfy the public 
purpose doctrine, fails to articulate what a comprehensive, deliberate legislative process is, 
with no floor to indicate the point below which a court would cease to defer. Id. at 504.  
For an analysis of how Justice Stevens’s adoption of a majoritarian approach amounted to 
judicial abdication, see Carol Necole Brown, Justice Thomas's Kelo Dissent: The Perilous 
and Political Nature of Public Purpose, 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 273, 276 (2016). 
131 Id. at 480-83. 
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A number of school redistricting and affirmative action cases also provide 
examples in which adherence to good process promotes legislative deference. In 
the 2016 case Fisher v. University of Texas, Justice Kennedy’s decision upholding 
the University of Texas’s affirmative action policy credited an admissions policy 
that was supported by a “reasoned, principled explanation,” a detailed “year-long 
study” and expert affidavits from admissions officers.132 And lower courts have 
relied on similar evidence to uphold school redistricting measures that have a 
disparate racial impact. For example, in reviewing a district court’s decision that 
the Nashville public school system’s “student assignment plan” was not motivated 
by discriminatory intent despite a segregative effect,133 the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the holding, pointing to evidence of a “well-defined, well-regulated, and 
transparent” decision-making process that included formation of an authoritative 
task force.134  
 
* * * 
 
As these cases demonstrate, process scrutiny can be important to resolving 
questions about underlying legislative motivation not only in the voting rights, 
Free Exercise and takings contexts, but also where both facially neutral policies 
and race-conscious measures are concerned. The range of cases indicates the utility 
of process scrutiny within constitutional adjudication more generally. While the 
breadth of application leads to a host of institutional and normative considerations 
taken up in Parts IV and V, respectively, the next Part explores how, in the context 
of executive branch action, a similar relationship exists between procedural rigor 
(or the lack thereof) and policy vindication (or the lack thereof).     
 
                                                 
132 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211(2016) (upholding policy 
under strict scrutiny as sufficiently tailored to advance a compelling interest of fostering 
diversity) (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310, (2013). Conversely, 
in dissent, Justice Alito accused the University of depicting its process in a “shifting” and 
“less than candid” manner. Id.at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
133 The plan ended the practice of busing students from racially isolated areas to 
schools in racially diverse, high-income neighborhoods. See Spurlock v. Fox, 716 F.3d 
383, 385 (6th Cir. 2013). These students now had to choose between attending a school in 
their own (largely African-American and low income) neighborhood or being bused to a 
distant school which would not necessarily be the same school they previously attended. 
See id. 
134 Spurlock, 716 F.3d at 397–98; see also Doe v. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., No. 4:15-
CV-623-DPM, 2016 WL 5539617, at *8 (E.D. Ark. 2016) (holding that the Department of 
Education’s process of passing emergency regulations and hiring administrative officers 
despite a lack formal credentials was not sufficiently unusual, but rather plausibly showed 
“representative government pursuing divisive but not unconstitutional policy”). 
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III. EXECUTIVE BRANCH PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATORY INTENT 
 
The connections between procedural regularity and malintent are not 
limited to the legislative context; indeed, Arlington Heights specifically referenced 
the administrative context,135 and the same relationship between governmental 
processes and judicial review can be found in the context of executive action—in 
particular forms of executive action, especially presidential action, that are largely 
exempt from APA review.136 In the following case studies, which involve national 
security and immigration policy as well as military personnel policy—areas of 
exclusive or nearly exclusive executive power137—small-p process plays a 
remarkably important role in the scaling of judicial review.    
 
A.  Small-p Process and the Trump Travel Ban 
 
The connection between small-p process and executive motivation has 
been important in the judicial rulings surrounding President Trump’s immigration-
related executive actions that bar entry to individuals from a range of Muslim-
majority countries.138 While most commentators frame the travel ban litigation 
through the President’s repeated expressions of hostility against the Muslim 
faith,139 courts at all levels of the federal judiciary have tended to scale deference 
                                                 
135 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) 
(“legislative or administrative history”). 
136 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1095 (2009) (noting the myriad of ways, under statute and case law, that presidential 
functions are largely exempt from the purview of the judicial review mechanism of 
administrative law); id. at 1108 (“[T]he Supreme Court has twice stated that the President 
is not an agency” subject to the APA). See also infra notes 243-244 and accompanying 
text. 
137 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) 
(holding that the Court will defer to the “plenary and exclusive power of the President . . . 
in the field of international relations”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) 
(holding that when the President exercises delegated power to make “rules for exclusion 
of aliens” for “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” the court will not question it or 
balance it against other constitutionally protected interests); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century 
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 162 (2002) (“[T]he 
United States regularly maintains, and the courts frequently agree, that federal immigration 
laws should be subject to little or no judicial review . . . .”). 
138 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (first iteration); 
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (second iteration); 
Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (third iteration).  
139 As Noah Feldman argued shortly after the ban was announced, when it comes to 
“President Donald Trump’s travel ban, there’s one word you need to focus on: animus.” 
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based on their impression of the strength, or weakness, of the policies’ small-p 
procedures. In the lower courts, judges repeatedly linked process failure with 
constitutional invalidity. By contrast, the Supreme Court credited good process as 
a reason to give the Administration the benefit of the doubt. The more the 
government could show its policy was thoroughly vetted, the less the President’s 
disparaging remarks about Islam seemed to matter.140 Trump v. Hawaii thus 
provides an object lesson in the importance of small-p process in the scaling of 
judicial deference.  
 
1. Travel Bans 1.0 and 2.0: Process and Executive Invalidation 
 
President Trump issued his travel ban seven days after taking office. 
Within days of the initial rollout,141 judges immediately entered temporary 
restraining orders prohibiting its enforcement.142 These early cases, which were 
                                                 
Noah Feldman, Key Word for Travel Ban is ‘Animus’, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 4, 2017, 
10:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-04/key-word-for-travel-
ban-at-supreme-court-is-animus; see also David Cole, Trump’s Travel Bans—Look 
Beyond the Text, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 11, 2017), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/05/11/trumps-travel-bans-look-beyond-the-text/ 
(arguing that the travel ban has “taught Americans, and their judges, to be at once more 
skeptical of executive power and more solicitous of the rights of noncitizens.”). Donald 
Trump first mentioned the travel ban during a press conference while campaigning for 
President in 2015: “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States . . .” Ryan Teague Beckwith, President Trump’s Own 
Word Keep Hurting His Travel Ban, TIME (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://time.com/4703614/travel-ban-judges-donald-trump-words/. In a series of 
subsequent statements about the proposed ban, candidate Trump said, “I think Islam hates 
us,” “we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country,” “I’m talking territory 
instead of Muslim,” and “The Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed 
into [an] extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.” Alan Gomez, What President 
Trump has said about the travel ban, USA TODAY (June 11, 2017 10:42 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/11/what-president-trump-has-
said-about-muslims-travel-ban/102565166/.   
140 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393, 2418 (2018). 
141 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). The first iteration 
suspended refugee admissions for 120 days, indefinitely suspended the admission of Syrian 
refugees, and banned the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of nationals from Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Id. 
142 See Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-116, 2017 WL 386549, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 
2017) (“respondents are forbidden from removing petitioners—lawful permanent residents 
at Dulles International Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of this Order.”); 
Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CIV. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 
2017) (“petitioners have a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the removal of 
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upheld by the federal courts of appeal,143 drew a number of connections between 
intent and small-p process, including the absence of “expert agencies with broad 
experience on the matters’” and “no evidence that . . . a deliberative process took 
place.”144 In addition to those procedural irregularities, courts noted the “highly 
particular ‘sequence of events,’” including efforts by President Trump and his 
surrogates to find “legal” bases to ban Muslims from entering the country, as 
reason to block the policy.145 
The Trump Administration revoked its order in response to these early 
rulings and made a number of modifications,146 yet courts continued to cite process 
flaws as evidence of malintent. In one major case, the Fourth Circuit emphasized 
                                                 
the petitioner and others similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process and Equal 
Protection”); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (“the court finds that the States have met their burden of demonstrating 
that they face immediate and irreparable injury as a result of the signing and 
implementation of the Executive Order.”).  
143 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The Government 
has not shown that the Executive Order provides what due process requires, such as notice 
and a hearing prior to restricting an individual’s ability to travel.”); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. 
Supp. 3d 724, 736 (E.D. Va. 2017) (The Commonwealth is likely to succeed on its 
Establishment Clause claim because it produced evidence that the travel ban was motivated 
by religious animus).  
144 Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d. at 736; see also id. (contrary to the ordinary expected rollout 
of an order of this magnitude and significance, “there is evidence that the president’s senior 
national security officials were taken by surprise”). 
145 Id. at 737 (granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on their Establishment Clause 
claims). Courts also took issue with other procedural oddities, such as the administration’s 
abrupt reversal on whether lawful permanent residents (LPRs) were subject to the same 
travel restrictions as all other nationals from the designated countries. One court rejected 
the government’s effort to invoke a post-hoc White House counsel interpretation to cure 
due process concerns raised by a rule restricting entry to LPRs. The court refused to accept 
the government’s about-face regarding LPRs when it “offered no authority establishing 
that the White House counsel is empowered to issue an amended order superseding the 
Executive Order signed by the President and now challenged by the States,” a “proposition 
[that] seems unlikely.” See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1165. In light of the government’s 
changing interpretations of the order’s effect on LPRs, the court expressed skepticism that 
the Trump Administration would not revert back to denying entry to LPRs once again. See 
id.  
146 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The second order 
removed Iraq from the list of affected countries, exempted lawful permanent residents from 
the travel ban and removed the indefinite ban on Syrian nationals. This order also 
eliminated language providing lower-level discretion to make exceptions to the refugee 
ban for foreign nationals of “minority” faiths in their home countries—an effort largely 
seen as attempting to give preference to Christian asylum-seekers. Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 857 F.3d 554, 633 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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the procedural flaw of excluding national security agencies from the decision-
making process.147 This court also noted the post hoc nature of the national security 
rationale as well as government evidence that undermined the very effectiveness 
of the President’s policy.148 As with the first iteration, small-p procedural concerns 
provided evidence of improper governmental intent.149 Within these initial cases, 
the concepts of process failure and unconstitutional motivation were closely 
linked.  
 
2. Travel Ban 3.0: Process and Executive Vindication 
 
The Trump Administration’s third version of the travel ban, issued via 
presidential proclamation,150 took pains to address the lower courts’ concerns 
about small-p process.151 Government lawyers repeatedly touted a “worldwide” 
                                                 
147 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591-92.  
148 See id. at 592 (citing DHS report that the second iteration of the ban would not 
“diminish the threat of potential terrorist activity” as reason to find the government’s 
proffered purpose pretextual). 
149 See id. at 572, 601 (noting that the Order “drips with religious intolerance, animus, 
and discrimination,” and “cannot be divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the 
animus that inspired it”). At around the same time as the Fourth Circuit decision, the district 
court in Hawaii issued its own preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of Sections 2 
and 6 of the second iteration of the travel ban, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119, 1140 
(D. Haw. 2017), which was affirmed in large part by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2017). On a petition for a stay of the 
preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court did not directly address the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuit rulings that found the Government’s national security reasoning for EO-2 
unconvincing, but it left the injunction in place with respect to parties trying to enter the 
country who have a bona fide relationship with an entity or person in the United States. 
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017). The Court 
vacated its decision as moot after the order expired based on its own terms. Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
150 Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (indefinitely restricting 
the entry of certain nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Kora, Somalia, Syria, 
Venezuela, and Yemen). 
151 According to the government, DHS went through a detailed process in identifying 
which countries had information-sharing practices insufficient for the United States to vet 
foreign nationals entering the United States from those countries, identifying eight 
countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen.  See Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 591 (D. Md. 2017). The Acting 
Secretary of Homeland Security recommended entry restrictions on foreign nationals from 
each of those countries except Iraq. See id. Although Somalia’s practices were found 
sufficient, the Secretary still recommended entry restrictions for Somalian nationals as 
well. See id. Despite the DHS’s more tailored evaluation of the national security risk 
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process that involved close consultation with experts,152 a centerpiece of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ Trump v. Hawaii majority opinion that repeatedly touted good 
process153 as “a justification” for the entry ban that was “independent of 
unconstitutional grounds.”154 Although Roberts did not ignore the presence of the 
President’s patently biased statements,155 he recognized that, in addition to the 
Proclamation’s facial neutrality, it appeared to satisfy the judicial requirement of 
                                                 
associated with nationals from each of the designated countries, “49 former national 
security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials . . . state that ‘[a]s a national security 
measure,’ the Proclamation is ‘unnecessary’ and is of ‘unprecedented scope.’” Id. at 593. 
Further procedural problems with the Proclamation include that “concrete evidence” shows 
“country-based bans are ineffective,” the Proclamation fails to block nationals from certain 
countries with a non-Muslim majority that have “widely-documented” information sharing 
deficiencies, no nationals from the designated countries have committed terrorist acts in 
the United States in the last 40 years, and no intelligence shows that nationals from the 
designated countries pose a terrorist threat to the United States. Id. 
152 Brief for the Petitioners at 15, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-
965); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-
supreme-court.html?_r=0.  
153 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. By contrast, 
the lower courts continued to find contradictions in the agency review process as 
undermining the government’s national-security-based justifications. For example, a 
federal district court in Maryland concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a 
“misalignment between the stated national security goals of the ban and the means 
implemented to achieve them,” suggesting that the Government’s stated reason for the ban 
was not bona fide and not entitled to a presumption of deference. See Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 618. The court rejected the government’s contention 
that the Proclamation was issued through the “routine operations of the government 
bureaucracy,” and concluded that not only did the government present such weak evidence 
to that end, but combined with public statements and historical events suggesting religious 
animosity, the plaintiffs would likely prevail on an establishment clause claim. Id. at 628. 
The court thus granted an injunction, barring enforcement of the travel ban only with 
respect to foreign nationals with a bona fide relationship with a person or organization in 
the Unites States. See id. at 631. However, the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order 
pending disposition of the government’s appeal. Soon afterward, the Supreme Court 
granted the government’s petition for certiorari following a Ninth Circuit affirmance of a 
Hawaii district court order enjoining enforcement of the Proclamation. Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017). 
154 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420.  
155 See id. at 2417-18 (contrasting the way some presidents “have used [their] power 
to espouse the principles of religious freedom and tolerance on which this Nation was 
founded,” while others “performed unevenly in living up to those inspiring words”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403723 
13-Jun-19]                              Process Scrutiny        29 
 
a bona fide national security rationale promulgated through a careful and robust 
process.156  
 
B.  Ex Ante and Ex Post Proceduralism 
 
The discussion of small-p process, up until now, has focused on ex ante 
proceduralism. Ex ante procedures concern the quality of deliberation, 
involvement of experts, facilitation of regular public hearings and open debate and 
documentation of studies or other evidence underlying a given policy. Ex post 
procedures, by contrast, concern a coordinate institution’s ability to follow its own 
stated procedures—including adherence to allowances, exceptions or other 
promised mechanisms within the law itself.  To invoke language from Arlington 
Heights, ex post procedural defects can concern “departures” from an expected 
norm or baseline.157 While the Hawaii litigation provides an object lesson in the 
role of ex ante procedures in shaping constitutional discourse and doctrinal 
arguments about governmental power, deference and rights, it also says a lot about 
ex post procedures. And a number of seminal pre-Hawaii Supreme Court decisions 
also draw connections between ex post procedures and judicial deference to the 
President. 
 
1. Ex Ante and Ex Post Proceduralism in Hawaii 
 
Chief Justice Roberts made it clear in Hawaii that the Proclamation could 
be vindicated based on the rigor of ex ante procedures—specifically, the “world-
wide” and “multi-agency” review underlying the enactment.158  But Roberts also 
relied on the availability of ex post procedures—discretionary hardship waivers 
within the Proclamation—that further reinforced its “legitimate national security” 
foundations.159 Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor each wrote dissenting 
opinions linking ex ante or ex post process failure with improper motivation.160 
                                                 
156 See supra note 17. 
157 See generally supra Part II.A (discussing Arlington Heights’ consideration of 
“departures from normal procedur[e]” as evincing intent). 
158 Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2404, 2408. 
159 Id. at 2422. Roberts also pointed to the “ongoing process” of reviewing entry 
restrictions for possible termination every 180 days, the “significant exceptions” and 
“carveouts” from the entry restrictions applicable to certain categories of foreign nationals, 
and the Proclamation’s direction to DHS and the State Department to issue guidance to 
consular officers regarding the criteria for hardship waivers. Id at 2422-23. 
160 Breyer drew an explicit connection between procedural regularity and improper 
motivation, noting that while “[m]embers of the Court principally disagree about . . . 
whether or the extent to which religious animus played a significant role in the 
Proclamation’s promulgation or content . . . the Proclamation’s elaborate system of 
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Breyer focused on ex post procedures—namely the government’s actual 
implementation of the Proclamation’s waiver provisions. As he explained, the 
actual issuance of case-by-case exceptions would help decipher whether “the 
Proclamation is a ‘Muslim ban,’ [or] a ‘security-based’ ban.”161 Because, within 
the first month of the Proclamation, only two waivers were granted out of 6,555 
eligible applicants, Breyer believed the policy likely failed ex post review.162 
Breyer also noted that, by the time of Hawaii, other promised ex post procedures 
had not been issued—still another reason to subject the Proclamation to more 
careful scrutiny.163 Whereas Breyer focused on ex post procedure,164 Sotomayor 
expressed doubt regarding the veracity of the government’s ex ante procedures, 
                                                 
exemptions and waivers can and should help us answer this question.” Id. at 2429 (Breyer, 
J. dissenting). 
161 Id. at 2430 (“[I]f the Government is applying the exemption and waiver provisions 
as written, then its argument for the Proclamation’s lawfulness is strengthened. . . [But] if 
the Government is not applying the system of exemptions and waivers that the 
Proclamation contains, then its argument for the Proclamation’s lawfulness becomes 
significantly weaker.”).  
162 Id. at 2431. Breyer argued that, even as the number of granted waivers increased 
over time, it was still surprisingly low relative to the number of likely eligible individuals. 
Id; see also id. at 2431-32 (noting the contrast between the Proclamation’s stated 
exemptions for those with significant business or professional obligations, close family ties 
in the U.S., asylum seekers, refugees and certain nonimmigrant visas and the miniscule 
number of waivers approved). For example, between December 8, 2017 and January 8, 
2018, the State Department received almost 7,000 applications from visa-eligible nationals 
of listed countries. As of March 2018, waivers were granted to less than 1.5% of the 
otherwise visa-eligible and admissible applicants. Torbati & Rosenberg, Exclusive: Visa 




163 See Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2431 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting the lack of promised 
guidance to consular officials for implementing waivers); id. at 2441 (Breyer, J. 
dissenting). Breyer also indicated that an ex post review could help determine whether the 
President had made the kind of “finding” contemplated by the statute on which it was 
based. See id. at 2430; see also 8 U. S. C. §1182(f) (vesting the President with authority to 
restrict the entry of foreign nationals whom he “finds . . . would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States”). 
164 Breyer closed his dissent by also suggesting that an ex ante analysis would support 
setting aside the Proclamation as well. See Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2433 (noting, as a reason 
to set aside the Proclamation, “the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on 
a website taken down only after the President issued the two executive orders preceding 
the Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion”).  
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including a professed “worldwide” review producing only 17 pages of material.165 
For Sotomayor, the majority’s ex ante analysis allowed “the President to hide 
behind an administrative review process that the Government refuses to disclose 
to the public.”166  
As the case turns to the merits on remand, ex ante or ex post review in the 
lower courts could prompt further findings into whether the Proclamation is about 
religious discrimination or national security.167 Indeed, lower courts could even 
read the majority’s decision in Hawaii—relying as it does on procedure as a reason 
for vindication168—to support a more rigorous review of the policy’s underlying 
vetting.169 Although the government at first appeared listening, more recent results 
are mixed:  while the U.S. State Department reported as of January 31, 2019 that 
2,673 applicants were “cleared for waivers”170—a number that does not confirm 
the actual numbers of waivers granted (and should thus be regarded cautiously)171 
—the available evidence suggests that the vast majority of waiver applications fail, 
with waivers granted reliably only in well-publicized cases.172 Indeed, by June 1, 
                                                 
165 See id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For Chief Justice Roberts, any 
quantitative floor would be arbitrary.  Id. at 2421. A 17-page report could be highly 
substantive, with a reasoned basis in expert analysis and extensive supporting materials 
which simply were not accessible by FOIA request. Id. Thus, even if the policy was 
overbroad in its reach, as the dissent argued, because of the complexity and sensitivity 
involved in the national security context, the Court could not substitute its judgement and 
the executive was entitled to deference. Id. 
166 Id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
167 Cf. Noah Feldman, Take Trump’s Travel Ban Back to Court, BLOOMBERG (June 
29, 2918, 12:29 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-07-27/trump-
loyalist-s-subpoena-is-momentous-turn (noting that the challengers on remand “could seek 
discovery to uncover new evidence of Trump’s thinking, including, potentially, drafts of 
the executive order or memos about it” and that if this discovery was allowed, “Who knows 
what they might reveal”). 
168 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
169 While discovery on such questions could be critical, it remains unclear whether the 
government will be ordered to produce it. As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, 
the President retains substantial deference, especially concerning discovery that might 
delve into sensitive matters of national security. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, 
J. concurring). 
170 Visa Information Resources, June 26 Supreme Court Decision on Presidential 
Proclamation 9645, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-
visas/visa-information-resources/presidential-proclamation-
archive/june_26_supreme_court_decision_on_presidential_proclamation9645.html (last 
visited June 2, 2019).  
171 See id.  (“Many of those applicants already have received their visas.”). 
172 See Rick Gladstone and Satoshi Sugiyama, Trump’s Travel Ban: How It Works and 
Who is Affected, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2018), 
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2019, the government had not updated its January 2019 figure. Thus, even as the 
Trump Administration claims victory over its travel restrictions in Hawaii, lower 
courts may still need to grapple with various aspects of the Administration’s 
processes to ensure that they remain meaningful—something more than a token 
commitment made just for litigation.  
 
2. The Executive and Ex Ante/Ex Post Procedure  
 
Hawaii was not the first time that ex ante or ex post procedural review has 
figured into major Supreme Court rulings of presidential action. Many of the post-
9/11 decisions involving the “war on terror” have been described as largely 
procedural in nature.173 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld174 invoked both ex ante and ex post 
process scrutiny to rule on the legality of military commissions at Guantanamo 
Bay. In terms of its actual holding, the Court applied ex post proceduralism, 
                                                 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-
works.html (noting that “[o]n the same day the Supreme Court announced its decision,” 
the State Department released data showing that “out of 33,176 waiver applications 
received through April 30, only 579 had been granted, about 2 percent”); Betsy Fisher and 
Samantha Power, The Trump Administration Is Making a Mockery of the Supreme Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/opinion/trump-travel-
ban-waiver.html (observing, based on successful waiver grants in well-publicized cases 
involving “tragic circumstances” and “celebrity testimonials,” that “[w]aivers appear to be 
given reliably only when much publicity is brought to bear”). 
173 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War 
on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 395 (2010) 
(observing that “the Court’s War on Terror habeas decisions manifest a far greater 
willingness to rule for petitioners on grounds of procedure than of substance”); Owen Fiss, 
The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 244 
(2006) (observing that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 
(2004) “conceives of procedure as an instrument to arrive at correct decisions”); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that courts have resolved cases pitting 
individual liberty against national security through the lens of procedural rather than 
substantive questions); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the 
Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 666 (2009) (“[C]ourts have [] put 
procedure to muscular uses—focusing on the means of coordinate branch decision-making, 
while still allowing the political branches to define the content of the substantive law.”); 
Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1013, 1013 (2008) (observing that “most of the court decisions in cases challenging” 
policies enacted during the war on terror “have not directly addressed substantive rights 
claims” but rather “have almost all been about process.”) 
174 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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rejecting the President’s commissions for failure to adhere to a requirement under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice requiring that commissions follow an 
“impracticability” finding regarding the use of courts martial.175 Shortly after the 
decision, Neal Katyal observed how ex ante procedure—specifically the lack of 
deliberation and inter-agency dialogue within the George W. Bush 
Administration—doomed its post-9/11 policies regarding the detention and trial of 
terror suspects in the courts.176 The commissions in Hamdan were especially prone 
to judicial defeat because they lacked buy-in from the Executive Branch’s own 
experts.177 “Through bypassing the interagency process, and squelching expertise 
under the aegis of political accountability, the Administration weakened the 
rationale for deference all on its own.”178  
In an important ruling regarding discovery obligations for Guantanamo 
cases, the D.C. Circuit in Bismullah v. Gates,179 applying ex post process scrutiny, 
placed onerous demands on the government, essentially requiring that it restart the 
entire evidence-gathering process with respect to each and every detainee because 
of a failure to follow procedures it had created to vet detention decisions at 
Guantanamo.180 While the Court had endorsed the proposition in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld that “fair process can be provided by nonjudicial decisionmakers,”181 
                                                 
175 Id. at 623. 
176 See Neal Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 65, 109-12 (2006). 
177 Id. at 71 (arguing that Hamdan “second-guessed the President’s interpretations 
perhaps because those interpretations had not earned the approval of the bureaucracy, 
including the Judge Advocates General and the State Department.”). 
178 See Neal Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 65, 71 (2006) 
179 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.5 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Decl. of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy 
¶¶ 4–6, 10–13 (May 31, 2007) (noting, inter alia, that tribunals were unable to verify that 
they had examined all the relevant, available information; agencies routinely denied 
requests for confirmation by Guantánamo personnel that the agency had no exculpatory 
information on a particular detainee; and exculpatory evidence was withheld from tribunals 
if it was believed to be ‘duplicative’ or ‘not relat[ing] to a specific allegation being made 
against the detainee’). 
180 Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 180 (2007). Declarations and empirical data 
undermined the presumption that the government had followed its own procedures, and as 
a result of these lapses the litigation became more focused on the agency’s compliance with 
process. See Decl. of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, ¶¶  5-24, 
Bismullah, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 2007) (No. 06-1197) (disclosing failures in 
the evidence-gathering process and a failure to adhere to the government’s procedures); 
Decl. of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy, ¶¶  4-6, 10-13, Bismullah, 
501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 2007) (No. 06-1197)  (same). 
181 Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. 
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detainees were often victorious in court when noting the government’s failure to 
follow its own procedures. Indeed, the government’s lapses in ex post procedure 
may have influenced the Supreme Court’s decision to restore habeas in 
Boumediene v. Bush and strike down an alternate review system fashioned by the 
political branches.182 To understand why Boumediene provides an object lesson in 
ex post procedure, one need only recall that the Supreme Court had initially denied 
certiorari in April 2017, only to reverse itself two months later, after the parties 
moved for rehearing and provided declarations attesting to the executive branch’s 
inadequate implementation of its own standards and procedures.183  
 
C.  The Trump Administration’s Ban on Transgender Servicemembers 
 
In a recent essay, former White House Counsel Neil Eggleston notes how 
President Trump’s decision to disregard the executive’s own internal operating 
rules has doomed a number of his signature policies in court.184 For Eggleston, the 
Trump Administration’s repeated defeats “serve as a warning to an unconventional 
administration that such process flaws invite judicial scrutiny and weaken public 
confidence in the President.”185 In cases challenging the Trump Administration’s 
policy blocking transgender individuals from serving in the military, courts have 
linked small-p process with invidious intent. While agencies maintain discretion 
to choose not to enforce certain policies or to rescind them, procedural irregularity 
still impels courts in both constitutional and statutory contexts to link procedural 
irregularity with improper motivation.  
In the wake of the President’s 2017 Twitter announcement banning 
transgender service-members,186 four federal district courts engaged in process 
scrutiny to grant preliminary injunctions enjoining the policy.187 Although those 
                                                 
L. REV. 1533, 1613 (2007). 
182 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
183 Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S 1328 (2007) (mem.), vacated, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007) 
(mem.). See also Landau, supra note 173, at 694.  
184 See W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the 
Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J. F. 825 (2018). 
185 Id. at 826. 
186 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 8:55AM, 
9:04AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864?, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472? (tweeting that “the 
United States Government will not accept or allow Transgender individuals to serve in any 
capacity in the U.S. Military”). 
187 Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017); Stockman v. Trump, No. 
EDCV 17-1799 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 9732572 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017); Stone v. Trump, 
280 F. Supp 3d 747 (D. Md, 2017); Karnoski v. Trump, 2017 WL 6311305, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 167232 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017). Two federal appeals courts denied 
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injunctions have been either stayed188 or lifted,189 merits litigation remains before 
several lower courts that have focused heavily on ex ante process scrutiny. Those 
courts, all of which granted preliminary injunctions, noted clear procedural defects 
such as a lack of inter-agency review that did not involve the Secretary of 
Defense190 and which left the Pentagon largely flummoxed191 as well as related 
concerns that the abruptness of the administration’s reversal of prior policy evinced 
“discrimination[] of an unusual character.”192  
                                                 
partial stays pending appeal. Doe 1 v. Trump, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017); 
Stone v. Trump, No. 17-2398 (4th Cir. 2017). One court denied on standing grounds a 
request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Administration from ending the use of 
military resources to fund sex reassignment surgeries. Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 177. Other 
courts, by contrast, found that plaintiffs met standing requirements and granted preliminary 
injunctions on that issue. See Stockman, 2017 WL 9732572 at *14-15, 21; Karnoski, 2017 
WL 6311305 at *4, Stone, 280 F. Supp 3d at 765-66. 
188 Trump v. Karnoski, No. 18A625, 2019 WL 271944 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019); Trump v. 
Stockman, No. 18A627, 2019 WL 271946 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019). 
189 Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App'x 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
190 See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 212-13 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated sub 
nom. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App'x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Despite Trump’s claim that 
the policy was fashioned “after consultation with my Generals and military experts,” news 
accounts indicated that Secretary Mattis was only informed of it one day before it was 
announced. Julie Hirschfield Davis & Helene Cooper, Trump Says Transgender People 
Will Not Be Allowed in the Military, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017) (noting the “haste” that 
left the White House unprepared to answer basic questions, and Secretary Mattis’s 
purported unhappiness). 
191 See Brian Feldman, The Pentagon Was Just as Confused by Trump’s Ominous 
Tweet as You Were, SELECT ALL (July 26, 2017, 4:06PM), 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/07/the-pentagon-was-just-as-confused-by-trumps-tweet-
as-you.html (describing military officials anticipating a strike on North Korea in the few 
minutes between the first and second tweets).  
192  Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017); see Cristian Farias, In 
Case You Had Doubts, Trump’s Military Transgender Ban is Grossly Unconstitutional, 
N.Y. MAG. (July 27, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/trumps-
military-transgender-ban-is-grossly-unconstitutional.html (analyzing the transgender ban 
through an animus lens and comparing it to the travel ban); Scott-Skinner Thompson, 
Animus, Not Readiness:  Trump & Mattis Move Full Steam Ahead on Unconstitutional 
Trans Military Ban, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/44650/animus-readiness-trump-mattis-move-full-steam-
unconstitutional-trans-military-ban/; see also American Military Partner Association, 
LGBT Military Groups Condemn Trump-Pence Implementation Plan for Transgender 
Military Ban, AMPA (Mar. 23, 2018), http://militarypartners.org/breaking-trump-pence-
administration-announces-transgender-military-ban-implementation-details/. 
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One case in particular, Doe 1 v. Trump,193 contrasted the transgender ban 
not only with the exhaustive process in Rostker194 but also the extensive procedures 
underlying the policy of transgender inclusion that President Trump inherited.195 
All of the subsequent federal district court rulings agreed with Doe 1,196 noting 
“departure[s] from normal procedure,”197 such as “the absence of any considered 
military policymaking process” as well as “the sharp departure from decades of 
precedent on the approach of the U.S. military to major personnel policy changes,” 
and the “shocking” nature of the presidential announcement, which took “the 
Secretary of Defense and other military officials” by surprise, eliciting criticism 
from retired generals and members of Congress.198 
                                                 
193 Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017). 
194 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); see also Renan, supra note 120 and 
accompanying text. 
195 The government argued that under Rostker, presidential decisions around military 
policy—even those discriminating on the basis of gender—must be reviewed under “a 
highly deferential level of review.” Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 214. But courts highlighted 
the marked procedural differences between the two cases. The selective service policy at 
issue in Rostker was supported by a high level of deliberation and procedural rigor that was 
noticeably absent in the case of the ban on transgender servicemembers. Id. (citing Rostker, 
453 U.S. at 72). Beyond lacking the kind of study and analysis that warranted deference in 
Rostker, the record materials underlying the Trump transgender ban “were not supported 
and were in fact contradicted by the only military judgment available at the time.” Doe 1, 
275 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Obama Administration’s policy 
was the result of an elaborate process that included a working group of senior civilian and 
uniformed officers, a 91-page RAND Corporation report and further procedures that in turn 
led to implementing memoranda for each branch of the Armed Forces. President Trump’s 
tweet, by contrast, was preceded only by a press release and followed by a memorandum 
that the court found to be a mere smokescreen for a top-down directive—a reason to refuse 
the Trump Administration the deference it claimed it was owed. Id. at 179-80, 182, 184, 
213. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (finding that the President’s announcement “without 
any of the formality or deliberative processes that generally accompany . . . major policy 
changes that will gravely affect the lives of many Americans,” was “certainly” unusual). 
As Daphna Renan has observed, “The absence of the deliberative-presidency norm in the 
presidential conduct that gave rise to the transgender service members’ prohibition . . . 
eliminates [those features and] conditions on which judicial deference is premised.” Renan, 
supra note 120, at 2261. 
196 See Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 769 (D. Md. 2017); Karnoski v. Trump, 
2017 WL 6311305, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017); Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 
17-1799 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 9732572, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017). 
197 Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (D. Md. 2017). 
198 Id. at 770-71. As one court explained, “the only serious study and evaluation 
concerning the effect of transgender people in the armed forces”—namely, the RAND 
study and internal Defense Department analyses undertaken prior to the Obama 
Administration’s lifting on transgender ban—“led the military leaders to resoundingly 
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In the wake of these lower court injunctions, the Department of Defense 
engaged a second process culminating in a 44-page report announcing a refinement 
of its transgender military policy.199 While the merits of the revised policy remain 
in litigation, the changes provided a sufficient basis for the D.C. Circuit to lift the 
lower court’s injunction, and, owing to that injunction and a stay of injunction 
imposed by the Supreme Court,200 the new policy is currently in effect while 
litigation over its merits continues.201   
 
IV. PROCESS SCRUTINY IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
A.  Motivational Inquiries and Institutional Context 
 
Courts have invoked process scrutiny to justify closer inspection of the 
actions of both legislative and executive acts at the state and federal levels, and 
often without explicit reference to the way that institutional concerns such as 
federalism, separation of powers and/or institutional competency might alter the 
analysis. While the surrounding case law offers little by way of explicit guidance, 
it is unlikely that reviewing courts see these divergent contexts as following a 
single standard. Consider, for example, the difference between Trump v. Hawaii 
on the one hand and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission202 on the other.  In Masterpiece, the Court conducted hair-splitting 
analysis of proceedings before a state civil rights commission to find that it 
improperly disparaged the religious views of an evangelical baker who refused to 
                                                 
conclude there was no justification for the ban.” Stockman, 2017 WL 9732572, at *18. Still 
another concluded that “[a] capricious, arbitrary, and unqualified tweet of new policy does 
not trump the methodical and systematic review by military stakeholders to understand the 
ramifications of policy changes.” Stone, 280 F. Supp. 3d. at 771. Despite these stinging 
repudiations, courts have stressed that their decisions do not necessarily bind the military 
to the previous, comprehensive study, leaving it to the President to order further studies 
and reexamine the policy. See, e.g., Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 215. 
199 Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App'x 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting the procedural 
efforts that went into the new policy including “creation of a panel of military and medical 
experts, the consideration of new evidence gleaned from the implementation of the policy 
on the service of transgender individuals instituted by then-Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter [] and a reassessment of the priorities of the group that produced the Carter Policy”). 
It is important to note, however, that the D.C. Circuit noted these procedural differences 
not for their effect on the merits of the policy, but rather as evidence of a change in law or 
fact to warrant disslolution of the earlier injunction. Id. at 22. 
200  Trump v. Karnoski, No. 18A625, 2019 WL 271944 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019); Trump 
v. Stockman, No. 18A627, 2019 WL 271946 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019). 
201 Doe 2, 755 F. App'x at 23. 
202 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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do business with a gay couple.203 The Court found that the taint of animus raised 
by the remarks of a single commissioner were not adequately cleansed by the 
commission’s multi-member structure or the subsequent rounds of state court 
review, including de novo review before a state appellate court.204 In that particular 
context, “even subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of religion constituted 
improper state-sponsored discrimination.205 A few days after the decision in 
Masterpiece, Hawaii upheld President Trump’s entry restrictions on foreign 
nationals despite a regular outpouring of utterances evincing much more explicit 
animus toward a particular religion than in Masterpiece.206  
Although many scholars expressed difficulty reconciling the two cases,207 
the difference may indeed be explained by the divergent institutional and 
                                                 
203 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (describing the absence of a “neutral and 
respectful” enforcement based on the statement of one commissioner that equated certain 
religious beliefs with the defense of slavery and the Holocaust). Some commentators argue 
that the Court essentially manufactured these apparent problems with the commission’s 
ruling in order to “duck” thornier questions at the intersection of non-discrimination and 
free speech. Michael Dorf, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling Should (But Probably Won’t) 
Doom the Travel Ban, DORF ON LAW (June 4, 2018, 11:33 AM). 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-should-but.html.  
204 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (finding “no objection to [the disparaging] 
comments from other commissioners,” no “mention [of] those comments” in the “later 
state-court ruling reviewing the Commission’s decision,” and no disavowal of the 
comments “in the briefs filed in this Court”). But see id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that any taint based on “the comments of one or two Commissioners” was 
removed after “several layers of independent decisionmaking”). 
205 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)) (internal quotation omitted). 
206 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416-18, 2420 (describing statements made by candidate 
Trump and his surrogates). See Leah Litman, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Entry Ban, 
TAKE CARE (June 4, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-and-the-
entry-ban (arguing that “several aspects of the Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
that, if taken seriously, would dispose of several of the government’s arguments in the 
entry ban litigation”); Matt Ford, Why Trump Should Worry About the Supreme Court’s 
Cakeshop Ruling, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 4, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/148706/trump-worry-supreme-courts-cakeshop-ruling 
(“If anything, Trump’s remarks on the campaign trail present far more damning evidence 
of religious animus than anything said by a Colorado civil-rights commissioner.”). 
207 See Ilya Somin, The Supreme Court’s Indefensible Double Standard in the Travel-
Ban Case and Masterpiece Cakeshop, VOX (June 27, 2018, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/6/27/17509248/travel-ban-religious-
discrimination-christian-muslim-double-standard (noting that “the different results in the 
two cases arise from the application of a double standard between immigration (especially 
when linked to national security) and other areas of government policy”); see also Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (expressing dismay over the inconsistencies 
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substantive contexts. While the Hawaii Court appears to have been chastened by 
separation of powers concerns that were especially prominent given the 
overlapping contexts of national-security and immigration, the Masterpiece Court 
found itself less constrained in the “very different context [of] an adjudicatory 
body deciding a particular case.”208 Thus, despite disagreement “on the question 
whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into account in 
determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion,” 
Masterpiece involved adjudication before a state civil rights commission—and, in 
that context, the Court appeared comfortable not only divining motivation, but 
doing so in a way that ascribed the views of one member to the entire panel.209  
 
B.  Conventional Critiques of Process Scrutiny 
 
The judicial reluctance to spell out precisely how institutional concerns 
might bear on process scrutiny may stem from a more deep-seated and long-held 
reluctance to delve into political branch process, especially in constitutional 
adjudication. And scholars, for their part, have long questioned the judicial role in 
policing the legislative process, arguing that courts lack the institutional capacity 
to understand, much less second-guess, the wide-ranging inquiry that defines the 
legislative process.210 Other scholars have also equated procedural review with the 
                                                 
between the majority opinions in Hawaii and Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
208 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730 
(2018). 
209 Id. (emphasis added). 
210 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative 
Process, 91 B. U. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (2011) (identifying the most frequent objection to 
such review as a violation of the separation of powers); Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons 
of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM. L. REV. 
2835, 2869 (2009) (describing and countering the argument that judicial analysis of the 
legislative process would defy a “strong tradition of judicial noninterference in the internal 
operations of political decision makers”); Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and 
Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 655, 752 (2017) (analyzing the enforced-bill rule and describing it as a “species of 
the broader principle that the Court lacks power to police the internal procedures of the 
legislative branch”); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the 
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases:  An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 
YALE L.J. 1707, 1755 (2002) (criticizing arguments permitting the Court to second-guess 
congressional factfinding because the Court is not competent to “generaliz[e] about 
political processes”); Victor Goldfeld, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group 
Politics:  Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional 
Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2004) (arguing for review of legislative 
deliberation but refraining from encouraging review of, or demanding more rigorous, 
factfinding). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403723 
40 Process Scrutiny [13-Jun-19 
 
kind of improper intrusion into the prerogative of a co-equal branch that confuses 
Congress for a lower court or an administrative agency.211 While the state courts 
have a more fully developed doctrine of procedural review,212 the federal system 
generally leaves the correction of process failure to the political branches.213 
 
C.  Process Scrutiny and “Semi-Substantive” Review 
 
                                                 
211 See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The 
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative 
Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing 
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Frickey & Smith, supra note 210; Phillip P. 
Frickey, The Fool on the Hill. Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and 
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996); Barry Friedman, Legislative 
Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757 (1996); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The 
Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731 (1996); Glen 
Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to 
Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 465-66 (2003). 
212 See Frickey & Smith, supra note 210, at 1712 (noting the prevalence of state court 
review of certain procedural rules, particularly in the context of ballot initiatives); see also 
Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-
Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957 (1999); Robert F. Williams, State 
Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial 
Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional 
Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single 
Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (2001). 
213 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. A further argument against judicial review 
of legislative procedure is grounded less in comparative institutional expertise and more in 
a certain confidence that the political branches have the willingness and inclination to 
correct their mistakes: on this view, legislatures will remedy flawed legislation, and if they 
fail to do so, executive branch officers will refuse to enforce. See Linde, supra note 23, at 
242-44 (expressing confidence that the political branches will remedy procedurally 
deficient laws by reenacting them or through non-enforcement). Judicial review of 
procedure is somewhat more common in state courts. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 210, 
at 1712 (noting the prevalence of state court review of certain procedural rules, particularly 
in the context of ballot initiatives); see also Brannon P. Denning & Smith, supra note 212; 
Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative 
Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987). This theory of self-
regulatory politics suggests that even while a small number of legislators might “cut 
procedural corners,” their transgressions will be remedied by either the legislative body’s 
own oversight functions, the executive branch enforcement function or the electorate, 
which will correct their representatives through either elections or referenda. Linde, supra 
note 23, at 241-42. 
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Moreover, there is an emerging literature, some building on Ely’s theory 
of representation reinforcement,214 others on Linde, that engages a more expansive 
form of procedural review. Some scholars argue that a court should review the 
constitutionality of a law not only by review of its content (or substance) but also 
through its process of enactment.215 This form of “semi-substantive” review of 
legislation has a rich pedigree—extending as far as back McCulloch v. 
Maryland216—and takes on manifold forms. It can be expressed by a court’s 
questioning of how a law is enacted—as in United States v. Lopez, which turned 
in part on a lack of sufficient legislative findings;217 of any legislative intent which 
can be imputed onto a law—as in Washington v. Davis;218 of the time period in 
which a law was enacted as measured against more contemporary mores and 
usefulness—as in Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texas;219 and of the 
                                                 
214 See supra Part I.A. 
215 See Coenen, supra note 210, at 2838. See also Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, 
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1281 (2002). 
216 Coenen, supra note 210, at 2870. 
217 See id. at 2845. Lopez triggered a wave of criticism, with scholars strenuously 
opposing the idea that the Court might approve certain laws “as long as Congress engaged 
in due process of lawmaking by drafting statutes carefully and documenting, either by 
formal or informal findings, a connection between interstate commerce and the federal 
statute in question.” Frickey & Smith, supra note 210, at 1721. The Rehnquist Court 
reprised its “due deliberation” requirement in cases such as Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452 (1991), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), underscoring the idea that 
deference would be forthcoming when federal law was supported by a meticulous factual 
record demonstrating a close fit between the particular aims of a given statute and the basis 
of constitutional power invoked to pass it. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 210, at 1720-
23. In subsequent cases, the Court continued to dedicate substantial analysis to perceived 
procedural inadequacies in various pieces of federal legislation. See Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) 
(concluding the Patent Remedy Act was not sustainable under Section 5, in part because 
the legislative record showed “no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a 
pattern of constitutional violations”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-90 
(2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act went beyond Section 5 
authority after searching the legislative record for evidence that the law was congruent and 
proportional to the identified unconstitutional conduct); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001) (finding Congress could not subject the States to 
money damages under the Americans with Disability Act because the legislative record 
contained insufficient evidence of State discrimination against the disabled). 
218 See Coenen, supra note 210, at 2848. 
219 See id. at 2849-50. 
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institution or body enacting the law—as in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke.220  
For its adherents, semi-substantive review has an inherently “self-
limiting” nature, as the reviewing court is simply remanding to the enacting body 
to adhere to well-established principles of deliberation when it next proposes the 
law.221 And when a court identifies an error or flaw in the process of enactment 
and invalidates a law under such review, the legislative body may proceed with 
enacting the same content into law provided that it complies with the necessary 
“deliberation-enhancing” protocols.222 For others, such decisions wrongly 
transplant the democratic deliberation mechanisms associated with APA review of 
administrative action to statutory interpretation.223  
 
D.  Reconciling Small-p Process with the Court’s Animus Doctrine 
 
 Given the reluctance to second-guess political branch process, the 
Supreme Court has often sidestepped review of small-p process to focus more 
squarely on substantive motivation. During the past 25 years, the Court’s “animus” 
doctrine has largely overshadowed (if not overtaken) an Arlington Heights-style 
framework of discriminatory intent. For this reason, the animus doctrine is widely 
seen to be a powerful tool to root out discrimination.224 This doctrinal shift may 
                                                 
220 See id. at 2852. 
221 See id. at 2872. 
222 Id. at 2867. 
223 See Frickey & Smith, supra note 210, at 1710 (describing the judicial scrutiny of 
administrative action, where the court examines the records of trial-like hearings for 
sufficient evidence to justify the agency’s determination). Frickey and Smith’s critique 
harkens back to Linde, who rejected heightened procedural review of the legislative 
process as missing the whole point of judicial review: rather than make substantive value 
judgments about “legislative purposes or their relative weights,” id. at 1711, courts were 
examining—improperly, according to Linde—the legislative means and engaging a 
second-order analysis of discredited Lochnerism, or “instrumental rationality.” Linde, 
supra note 23, at 204. 
224 See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 S. CT. 
REV. 183, 284 (2013) (arguing that animus “is successfully doing the work that arguments 
for heightened scrutiny have failed to do in equal protection cases challenging anti-gay 
discrimination”); Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 
IND. L.J. 27, 38-42 (2014) (noting the role of animus in Romer and Windsor  but concluding 
that reaching this holding under substantive due process or equal protection grounds would 
be more prudent); Barbara J. Flagg, Animus and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer 
v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833, 851-54 (1997) (arguing that, after Romer, “moral 
disapproval cannot be distinguished from animus” and concluding that “Romer does signal 
the beginning of a new era of equality for lesbians and gay men”); Steven Goldberg, 
Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion to Animus, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 801, 801 
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have occurred because courts were reluctant to review a legislative record with 
skepticism unless there were traces of political exclusion or minority capture.225  
While there is some disagreement about the cases that actually comprise 
the Court’s animus canon,226 the 1996 case of Romer v. Evans is widely recognized 
as the paradigm illustration.227 Romer invalidated Amendment 2, a ballot initiative 
that amended the Colorado Constitution to nullify all existing nondiscrimination 
protections for gays, lesbians and bisexuals in Colorado and prohibited the 
enactment of new ones.228 Testing the law against rational basis review, as the 
                                                 
(2006) (arguing that the logic behind the animus doctrine can be extended to challenges 
under the Establishment Clause to invalidate laws that make “a  reasonable observer feel 
like a pariah in the community”); David J. Herzig, DOMA and Diffusion Theory: Ending 
Animus Legislation through a Rational Basis Approach, 44 AKRON L. REV. 621, 626-27 
(2011) (noting that because “the Court will not grant suspect classification or other 
heightened scrutiny to same-sex couples, the ruling on DOMA will be governed by the 
rational basis standard,” such that it can be defeated by a finding of animus, or by reaching 
a “tipping” point in the evolution of social mores); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional 
Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 889 (2012) (arguing that “animus . . . functions as a 
doctrinal silver bullet” for groups that lack suspect class status); Animus and Sexual 
Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1767, 1767-68 (2014) (arguing that because animus is 
“nimble trope for framing and assessing negative attitudes toward sexual minorities by the 
political majority,” it may be a powerful legal mechanism for “embracing legal priorities 
outside of the contemporary mainstream”). 
225 See Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial 
Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2035 (2014). 
226 Most scholars attribute the flourishing of the doctrine to a series of rulings penned 
by Justice Kennedy that placed important boundaries on the scope of government action 
while expanding the substantive reach of due process and equal protection, primarily to 
gays and lesbians, beginning with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and culminating 
in Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003); U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). See Carpenter, supra note 224, at 187 
(writing prior to Obergefell  please verify) that “[t]he animus quadrilogy overlaps a gay-
rights trilogy that has charted the remarkable rise of respect for the dignity and rights of 
homosexuals”); Animus and Sexual Regulation, supra note 224, at 1767 (“A central feature 
of the Supreme Court's recent gay rights jurisprudence has been an awareness of—and 
antagonism toward—government actions fueled by animus toward sexual minorities. . . . 
[A]nti-gay animus has played a recurring and pivotal role in the landmark trio of Romer v. 
Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and, most recently, United States v. Windsor.”) (internal 
citations omitted. 
227 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
228 Amendment 2 also prevented any legislative or administrative arm of state or local 
government from enacting or enforcing any policies making “homosexual, lesbian or 
bisexual orientation” the basis for “minority status, quota preferences, protected status or 
claim of discrimination.” Id. at 264.   
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Court had done in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno229 and City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,230 Justice Kennedy found that the law in 
Romer did not “bear []a rational relation to some legitimate end” and that the law 
“fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”231 The Court thus invalidated 
Amendment 2 as motivated by invidious intent.232 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Romer stands in stark contrast to the 
process-driven analysis of the Colorado Supreme Court. Invoking Ely and Big-P 
process, the Colorado Supreme Court had focused on the way that Amendment 2 
undermined the participatory rights of gays, lesbians and bisexuals, who—unlike 
everyone else—were required to amend the state constitution prior to enacting 
favorable law.233 By handling the case through the prism of democratic 
deliberation rather than motivation, the Colorado Court avoided an inquiry into the 
intent of those who voted for it.234 While Kennedy did not ignore entirely the Big-
P disenfranchising aspects of Amendment 2,235 his opinion focused heavily on the 
link between improper motivation and norm irregularity, highlighting Amendment 
2’s undermining of historical legal traditions rather than the ordinary workings of 
                                                 
229 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
230 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  
231 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32. Kennedy noted that the law “impose[d] a special 
disability” upon gays, lesbians and bisexuals, who were “forbidden the safeguards that 
others enjoy or may seek without constraint.” Id. at 631. 
232 Kennedy wrote for the Court, “We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else. This Colorado cannot do.” Id. at 635.  
233 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 
(1993) (finding that Amendment 2 interfered with “the fundamental right to participate 
equally in the political process” and “impair[ing] a group’s ability to effectively participate 
. . . in the process by which government operates” and requiring, on remand, that the State 
meet the most exacting level of scrutiny). 
234 The Colorado Court’s decision to handle the case on such grounds reflected Ely’s 
argument that judicial exploration of motivations is unnecessary in cases of outright 
constitutional violation, because in those cases the violation suffices to warrant striking 
down the legislation regardless of the motivations of the lawmakers. As Ely explained, 
judicial exploration of motivations is only appropriate when there is a claim that a 
“constitutionally gratuitous” benefit has been improperly withheld. Ely, supra note 4, at 
145. In cases “where what is denied is something [to which] the claimant has a 
constitutional right—because it is granted explicitly by the terms if the Constitution or is 
essential to the effective functioning of a democratic government (or both)—the reasons it 
was denied are irrelevant.” Id.  
235 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (observing how Amendment 2 limited the ability of gays, 
lesbians and bisexuals to “obtain specific protection against discrimination only by 
enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the State’s 
view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability”). 
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deliberative processes.236 Justice Kennedy adopted a similar approach in his 
animus-based ruling in United States v. Windsor, drawing links between norm 
regularity and unconstitutional motivation. 237  
The evolution of animus as a talismanic proxy for improper motivation 
has obscured the kinds of small-p frameworks that had influenced Arlington 
Heights as well as Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, a 
case importing the Arlington Heights standard into the Free Exercise Context.238 
Romer, by avoiding an Ely-style analysis (as the Colorado Supreme Court had 
done), elevated the idea of norm deviation to occupy a more central role in 
constitutional adjudication. One might criticize those more recent decisions, and 
their shift away from canonical substantive doctrines (such as heightened scrutiny 
or fundamental rights)239 or Ely-style Big-P process, as resting on weaker 
                                                 
236 For example, Kennedy found it significant that Amendment 2 bucked “the structure 
and operation of modern antidiscrimination laws”—specifically, a century’s worth of state 
and local lawmaking that steadily (if incrementally) expanded upon the innkeeper’s 
common law duty to serve all customers, covering a larger number of entities and 
protecting a greater number of groups from discrimination. Amendment 2 reversed that 
pattern by, for the very first time, excluding a group from those protections, disrupting an 
“emerging tradition of statutory protection” that, prior to Amendment 2, had “follow[ed] a 
consistent pattern.” Id. at 627-29. In the argot of Arlington Heights, Amendment 2 engaged 
in “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” as well as “[s]ubstantive 
departures” reflective of an improper legislative purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 
267.  
237 Windsor invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013). In Windsor, Kennedy again focused on DOMA’s unusual and 
unprecedented nature. Never before had Congress enacted “a single, across-the-board 
federal definition of marriage”; federal law had previously displaced state-law definitions 
only in narrow and specific circumstances—for instance, in immigration law (to ensure the 
bona fides of marriages for purposes of family-based immigration) or in Social Security 
(to verify income criteria). Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690. DOMA upended that “history and 
tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage,” altering the delicate state-federal 
balance by rewriting the definition of “marriage” in “over 1,000 federal statutes and the 
whole realm of federal regulations.” Id. at 2692. 
238 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
239 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, A Publicity Updated and Then Three Thoughts on 
Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Windsor, DORF ON LAW (June 28, 2013, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/06 (“[I]t would seem much more straightforward for the 
Court simply to say that laws drawing distinctions based on sexual orientation are subject 
to heightened scrutiny, either because sexual orientation distinctions simply are sex 
distinctions (and sex distinctions are already subject to heightened scrutiny) or because 
LGBT persons have been subject to a history of discrimination that continues to this day 
(albeit to a lesser extent than in the past)”); see also Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered 
Potential, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 137, 138 (2015) (arguing that “Justice Kennedy 
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foundation and prone to future alteration240—or even reversal.241 If Romer provides 
a prime illustration of the ascendancy of animus as the chief mechanism for rooting 
out improper political branch motivation, it also highlights a significant (and 
unfortunate) replacement of process-based mechanisms, whether through 
representation reinforcement or process scrutiny, with more squarely norm-based 
mechanisms. And while the two kinds of interpretations can be overlapping, they 
have important differences. 
Hawaii is interesting from this perspective because the Court invoked 
Romer’s “animus” standard as an apparent compromise doctrine that would 
provide for a more careful consideration of extrinsic evidence than prevailing 
national security and immigration doctrines.242 Of course, the majority and 
dissenting Justices reached entirely different outcomes on the import of the 
                                                 
squandered an important opportunity to leave a more enduring gay rights legacy”); Leonore 
Carpenter & David S. Cohen, A Union Unlike Any Other: Obergefell and the Doctrine of 
Marital Superiority, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 124, 125 (2015) (“With Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to write an opinion that would have advanced lesbian 
and gay rights by focusing on an equality analysis and clarifying whether sexual orientation 
is a suspect class. Instead, Obergefell is largely a lengthy paean to traditional marriage that 
advances fundamentally conservative notions of family and intimate relationships.”). 
240 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) (observing how “a surprising 
amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as 
something of a quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and 
remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various 
constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, 
modification, or even reversal by Congress”). 
241 See Shannon Minter, All the Damage Brett Kavanaugh Could Do to LGBT Rights, 
THE ADVOCATE (July 12, 2018), https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2018/7/12/all-
damage-brett-kavanaugh-could-do-lgbt-rights; Chris Babits, How would Brett Kavanaugh 
Rule on Conversion Therapy?, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/12/how-would-
brett-kavanaugh-rule-on-conversion-therapy/?utm_term=.0889c84e1508; Bob Moser, 
What Trump’s Supreme Court Nomination Means for LGBTQ Rights, ROLLING STONE 
(July 10, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/what-trumps-
supreme-court-nomination-means-for-lgbtq-rights-697941/.  
242 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion “look[ed] behind the face of the 
Proclamation to . . . apply[] rational basis review” and thus entertained extrinsic evidence 
in the form of President Trump’s remarks about Islam. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 
2402 (2018). Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion went so far as to see in this standard 
of review “some common ground between the” majority and dissenting opinions, both of 
which “acknowledge that in some instances, governmental action may be subject to judicial 
review to determine whether or not it is ‘inexplicable by anything but animus.’” Id. at 2424 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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President’s statements, illustrating the difficulty courts have with motivational 
analysis. At the same time, Hawaii reflects a similar reluctance to hold the 
President to any particular set of baseline procedures. While the APA triggers 
rigorous procedural requirements and judicial review mechanisms for most 
ordinary forms of agency action,243 it generally does not reach presidential 
action.244 Presidential acts are largely exempt from the strictures of the APA, 
making the underlying deliberations (or lack thereof) of presidential decision-
making ordinarily non-justiciable.245 For this reason, scholars have argued that 
judicial review of executive branch behavior tends to be largely deferential and 
that the inherent flexibility within administrative law in any event allows courts to 
tone down review where presidential action is concerned.246 
 
 
V. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF PROCESS SCRUTINY IN RIGHTS CASES  
 
While it is clear that process scrutiny has trans-substantive aspirations 
across legislative and executive, and state and federal, contexts, it should not be 
applied in an undiscriminating way, heedless of context. But the fact that small-p 
process scrutiny might vary across different contexts—from reviewing presidential 
action versus an administrative functionary, or across federal and state contexts or 
when addressing international affairs versus domestic subject matter—should not 
alter the basic idea that a lack of process can provide important grounds for 
subjecting a given law or policy to heightened review for purposes of better 
understanding governmental motivation. While it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to provide a comprehensive treatment of these contextual differences, the 
discussion highlights their salience, laying a foundation for future work.247 
                                                 
243 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. The APA requires, inter alia, 
publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (2012), 
notice and opportunity for participation by interested individuals and entities, see id. § 
553(c), and “a concise general statement of [the] basis and purpose” for any rule the agency 
adopts. Id. 
244 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
245 Id.  
246 See Vermeule, supra note 136, at 1136 (focusing on national security and related 
emergencies); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 
(2001) (characterizing the presidency as the new center of the administrative state, and 
arguing that courts have recognized the relevance of Chevron deference, while rejecting 
“hard look” review, in the context of the presidency); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007), 1200-01 (highlighting 
judicial deference to the executive in foreign relations). 
247 Additional questions for future analysis are precisely what amount of good or bad 
process evidence would be required in specific areas of constitutional adjudication as well 
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A.  Process Scrutiny and Objectivity 
 
 One attraction of a procedural approach is that it provides a set of 
objective criteria for motivational analysis, offering a more concrete and 
identifiable set of benchmarks that can address—and potentially avoid—many of 
the current difficulties of ascertaining the motives of lawmakers, including 
concerns the inquiry reduces to nothing more than an ad-hoc, subjective 
assessment. Moreover, to the extent that relatively powerless persons and 
marginalized groups often experience the greatest impact of a law or policy that is 
procedurally tainted, a process-based approach to motivational analysis can inform 
review of constitutional claims by groups that do not receive special solicitude 
under current constitutional doctrines. Of course, process scrutiny has drawbacks 
as well—in particular that it could allow legislatures to favor form over substance 
and use spurious procedures to achieve judicial validation for problematic policies. 
Hence, the framework must be applied carefully, with courts ensuring that process 
not become a fig leaf behind which the government can avoid scrutiny. 
Still, when one reviews the process by which a policy or law was enacted 
and compares that process with the usual and established norms of law and policy-
making, one has a baseline—or, at least, a range—of standard and normal ways of 
performing these tasks.  When it is apparent that a law or policy under examination 
was enacted well outside the range of normal standards and procedures, the basis 
for judicial scrutiny is couched in more objective analysis. In such cases, process 
scrutiny avoids the need to divine the collective animus of a legislature or a branch 
of government based on mere speculation or subjective interpretations. 
To illustrate, consider a metaphorical equivalent in the criminal context. 
In the case of a person charged with assault, evidence of a history of intemperate 
remarks or a hostile personality may not be entirely irrelevant, but it is far weaker 
evidence than showing the observable, measurable and recorded steps a defendant 
took in carrying out an action. When the defendant’s observable and measurable 
history of behavior carrying out an action—buying a baseball bat, going to the 
victim’s house, washing blood off the bat, burying bloodied clothing—is 
sufficiently apparent, the defendant’s state of mind—animus toward the victim—
becomes, if not irrelevant, far less necessary to proving the prosecution’s case. 
Similarly, in the case studies explored in this Article, the observable and recorded 
steps taken by legislative or executive actors in creating law and policy provide 
easily recognized and objective evidence of intent.   
Of course, different jurists will disagree, even in their assessment of such 
objective factors. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Hawaii. For the lower 
courts, the events that led to the Proclamation were devoid of the thorough review 
                                                 
as how cases of mixed motive/mixed purpose might be handled. 
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the government claimed to follow, such that a faulty process, combined with 
discriminatory statements, supported a finding that it was grounded in animus.248  
But the Supreme Court, relying on the same record, found it sufficient to warrant 
deferential review and preclude the Court from substituting its own judgment in 
this policy area.249 In other words, while the Supreme Court and lower court 
opinions in Hawaii reflect the notion that courts are more likely to defer to policies 
couched in “good process,” and less so during moments of “bad process,” the 
plaintiff’s task in proving that a policy is inexplicable on grounds other than 
animus remains a difficult hurdle, especially if the court has already deemed 
legislative or administrative process sufficiently “regular.”   
Especially because contemporary forms of discrimination are often less 
overt (and thus easier to mask) than when the Court’s discriminatory intent 
doctrine was born,250 a requirement of even circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent can present roadblocks for plaintiffs seeking to invalidate 
legislation under the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence. This is even more 
true because, under ex ante review,251 legislative bodies of average sophistication 
can hide subtle forms of discrimination under processes that satisfy superficial 
standards of deliberateness. Thus, one serious concern with small-p procedural 
frameworks is that they too easily allow legislatures to use procedure as a fig leaf, 
concealing malintent while obtaining judicial validation for problematic 
policies.252 
Along similar lines, Shirin Sinnar criticizes Hawaii as simply providing “a 
detailed roadmap for the return of racial origin quotas.”253 After Hawaii, she writes, 
 
[A]n administration choosing to ban, say, Mexicans, Central Americans, 
or Africans, need only do the following: 1) identify a legitimate objective, 
such as vetting nationals or deterring crime; 2) draft an order that cites that 
objective to exclude certain nationalities, while making no explicit 
                                                 
248 See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text. 
249 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (concluding that, based on the 
thorough process the government followed, “we cannot substitute our own assessment for 
[that of] the Executive[]”).   
250 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 172 (2016); 
see also supra note 27.  
251 See supra note 165-225 and accompanying text. 
252 Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1013, 1031-32 (2008) (noting cases in which “process is intentionally used to avoid 
difficult substantive questions” in “a deliberate attempt by the government to delay and 
ultimately avoid adjudication of the merits”). 
253 See Shirin Sinnar, Trump v. Hawaii: A Roadmap for New Racial Origin Quotas, 
SLS BLOGS (June 26, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/06/26/trump-v-hawaii-a-
roadmap-for-new-racial-origin-quotas/.  
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reference to race; 3) leave out some countries from the order that are 
racially similar to the groups excluded, and include others that are not, to 
avoid the appearance of bias; 4) generate a secret report based on a 
“worldwide” multi-agency review that purports to justify the country 
selection; 5) exempt some categories of immigrants from certain countries 
to appear less arbitrary; 6) allow for individual waivers, at least in theory; 
and 7) after the order is issued, make small modifications to appear 
responsive to changed conditions. As long as the administration does that, 
the President should feel free to dehumanize and race-bait all he wants on 
Twitter. Today’s decision suggests that five justices of our highest Court 
will not object. Indeed, they have shown the way. 
 
Sinnar suggests that the political branches can game a procedural requirement by 
paying lip service to, and by executing a vacuous pro forma compliance with, a 
process that does nothing to remove its underlying prejudicial content. As she 
notes, one serious danger of a process-based approach is that a “process”—
insincere, insufficient, but a process nonetheless—could satisfy formal 
requirements without any substantive content demonstrating a strong, well-
considered policy.  So long as the roadmap is followed, the government appears 
subject to little accountability.  
Indeed, commentators have noted the peculiar way that the Supreme Court 
chose not to comb the record too deeply for evidence of animus in Hawaii, while 
it went to great lengths to do so in Masterpiece.254 These observations underscore 
the perennial concern that judicial review invites application of policy preferences, 
in particular when deciding whether or not to apply heightened scrutiny, and that 
even tests which measure objective, procedural rigor are still prone to the 
ideological and subjective influences of the Justices themselves.255 
                                                 
254 See, Michael C. Dorf, At SCOTUS, It’s All About Taint, DORF ON LAW (June 25, 
2018, 11:46 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/at-scotus-its-all-about-taint.html; 
Christian Farias, The Supreme Court Continues to Chip Away at Protections for Minority 
Voters, N.Y. MAG (June 25, 2018, 5:42 PM) 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/06/abbott-v-perez-supreme-court-rules-on-
racial-gerrymandering.html. 
255 One additional decision from the Court’s 2017-18 Term provides a further 
cautionary tale about the ability of jurists to find common ground in their mutual 
understandings of what legislative regularity actually is, as well as its constitutional 
implications. In Abbott v. Perez, the Supreme Court decided a racial gerrymandering case 
on appeal from a Texas district court decision to strike down a redistricting plan as violative 
of statutory and constitutional rules against discrimination in the redistricting process, 
including the Voting Rights Act. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018). In 2017, invoking 
Arlington Heights, a Texas district court found that the 2013 redistricting plan passed by 
the Texas legislature for the United States House of Representatives, Texas House of 
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B.   Small-p Process Scrutiny and Emerging Rights Claims 
 
Nevertheless, the form of review that this article describes—using 
procedural irregularity as a basis for applying more careful judicial scrutiny—
remains highly important in thinking about how courts resolve rights disputes. 
While a theory of representation-reinforcement successfully describe the function 
of the court in protecting against wholesale exclusion, they leave something to be 
desired in securing concrete protections.256 A model which instead looks to 
objective indices of procedural regularity through small-p process will not only 
require a qualitative assessment of the context of a given policy but also match the 
process of legislative and policy enactment with long-established and more 
objective standards. Indeed, the approach may be less subject to political swings 
on the bench while serving as an effective mechanism for identifying improper 
legislative intent, perhaps even more so than current methods. 
Indeed, many of our most vulnerable populations are subject not only to 
harsh substantive laws but procedurally defective ones as well. From 
undocumented foreign nationals facing harsh immigration restrictions,257 to 
                                                 
Representatives and Texas Senate had discriminatory effect and was “discriminatory at its 
heart.” Perez v. Abbott, 274 F. Supp. 3d 624, 651 (W.D. Tex. 2017), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Morris v. Texas, 138 S. Ct. 747 (2018), and rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2305 
(2018). This holding was informed in significant part by procedural irregularity in 
enactment. Specifically, the lower court relied on evidence that the bill was passed quickly 
during a special session without any deliberative review to remove discriminatory “taint” 
from a 2011 plan which had previously been struck down, and thus with an intent to carry 
through those discriminatory terms. Id. at 652. However, in June 2018, the Supreme Court 
decided that evidence of “brevity of the legislative process [does not] give rise to an 
inference of bad faith.” Abbott, 138 S.Ct. at 2328-29. Because the legislative body had 
legitimate reasons for the process it followed, and because “past discrimination cannot . . . 
condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful” the plaintiffs’ evidence of “bad 
process” could not overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Id. at. 2324. Therefore, 
because the majority found the facts on the record to suggest that intent was legitimate and 
enough “good process” was followed, the court did not apply heightened scrutiny to any 
circumstantial evidence. Id. at. 2328. The discrepancy between Justice Alito’s analysis for 
the majority and the lower court’s interpretation of process failure bears remarkable 
similarity to the differing analysis by the Supreme Court and the lower courts in Hawaii 
insofar as the travel ban is concerned. In both cases, the lower courts were willing to infer 
that past discriminatory statements attributed to the enacting body tainted, to some extent, 
any semblance of “good process.”  
256 See generally Ely, supra note 4. 
257 See Seth Freed Wessler, Bills Modeled After Arizona’s SB 1070 Spread Through 
States, COLORLINES (Mar. 2, 2011, 10:33 AM), http://www.colorlines.com/content/bills-
modeled-after-arizonas-sb-1070-spread-through-states (noting an “[u]nprecedented 
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transgender individuals denied access to bathrooms,258 to convicted sex offenders 
subject to severe punishments after they have been released from the criminal 
                                                 
[w]ave” of anti-immigrant bills following Arizona’s 2010 SB 1070 law); State Omnibus 
Immigration Legislation and Legal Challenges, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/omnibus-immigration-
legislation.aspx (describing omnibus state anti-immigration bills enhancing state and local 
roles in immigration enforcement); see, e.g., Anti-Illegal Immigration Laws in States, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/04/22/us/anti-illegal-
immigration-laws-in-states.html (mapping the 13 states that “passed or debated similar 
legislation” to Arizona’s 2010 immigration enforcement law); Aaron Couch, State Illegal 
Immigration Laws: What Have They Accomplished?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 23, 
2011), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0323/State-illegal-immigration-
laws-What-have-they-accomplished (examining the efficacy of the “wave of immigration 
laws” in states from 2006 to 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800–01 
(Jan. 30, 2017) (making “sanctuary jurisdictions” ineligible for federal grants and 
expanding the category of those “prioritize[d] for removal,” including individuals 
“convicted of any criminal offense”); Nathan D. Clark, Note, “Not the Place for You”: 
Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances, Federal Preemption, and Keller v. City of Fremont, 
719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014), 93 NEB. L. REV. 226, 
227 (2014) (examining state and local anti-immigrant laws, such as Fremont, Nebraska’s 
“prohibit[ing] undocumented immigrants from renting houses within [the city]”); Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Deportation Priorities Will Expand to Include Those Convicted of Even 
Minor Crimes, ABA J. (Feb. 21, 2017, 11:52 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/deportation_priorities_will_expand_along_with_
the_expedited_removal_process (noting that an expansion in immigration policy in which 
“[e]ven those convicted of traffic crimes would be a priority” for deportation).  
258 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., ANTI-TRANSGENDER LEGISLATION 
SPREADS NATIONWIDE, BILLS TARGETING TRANSGENDER CHILDREN SURGE 2 (2016), 
http://assets.hrc.org//files/assets/resources/HRC-Anti-Trans-Issue-Brief-FINAL-
REV2.pdf?_ga=2.107187777.2106740331.1507582781-564253486.1507582781 
(describing 44 anti-transgender bills filed, “more than double” the previous year’s 
legislative session, ranging from limiting access to medical care to expanding state “First 
Amendment Defense Act” bills to allow publicly funded programs to refuse transgender 
individuals service); see also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 
709, 715, 721 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (deferring to 
the Department of Education’s regulations providing for “comparable” separate sex 
bathroom facilities, as interpreted in an opinion letter by the Department’s Office for Civil 
Rights to apply to transgender individuals “consistent with their gender identity,” and 
subsequently remanded when the Department of Education withdrew that opinion letter); 
Sam Williamson, Note, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board: 
Broadening Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Students, 76 MD. L. REV. 1102, 1103 
(2017) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit should have conducted an independent analysis, 
extending the major questions doctrine and looking to Title VII case law); Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court Won’t Hear Major Case on Transgender Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 
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justice system,259 to criminal defendants charged under laws reacting to the 
perceived existence of the juvenile “superpredator”—an invented persona260—
governments have increasingly enacted laws and policies woefully lacking in fact-
based analysis.261  
                                                 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/supreme-court-transgender-
rights-case.html (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision not to decide G.G’s case in light 
of the changed policy). 
259 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). In Packingham, the 
Supreme Court invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a North Carolina statute making 
it a felony for registered sex offenders to access social media sites with minors as members. 
Id.; see also Keri Burchfield et al., Public Interest in Sex Offenders: A Perpetual Panic?, 
15 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST. L., & SOC’Y, Dec. 2014, at 96, 97–102 (examining whether 
a perpetual moral panic exists against sex offenders that prompts increasingly restrictive 
legislation); Max B. Bernstein, Note, Supervised Release, Sex-Offender Treatment 
Programs, and Substantive Due Process, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 295–96 (2016) 
(arguing against mandating penile plethysmograph testing as a condition of federal 
supervised release as a constitutional violation of the right against bodily intrusions); Beth 
Schwartzapfel, I Married a Sex Offender, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/18/i-married-a-sex-offender (describing a 
law that requires special marks on the passports of sex offenders as part of the “never-
ending punishment” of life on the sex-offender registry);  Roger N. Lancaster, Panic Leads 
to Bad Policy on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Feb. 20, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/20/too-many-restrictions-on-sex-
offenders-or-too-few/panic-leads-to-bad-policy-on-sex-offenders (asserting that laws that 
provide “for the indefinite detention of sex offenders after the[y] complet[e] . . . their 
sentences,” “‘child safety zone’ laws,” and lifelong GPS monitoring systems fail any 
classic criminal punishment justification, from rehabilitation to deterrence). 
260 See Adam Liptak, Did the Supreme Court Base a Ruling on a Myth?, N.Y. TIMES 
(March 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/supreme-court-repeat-
sex-offenders.html. 
261 Consider, for example how many of the “bathroom bills” passed after Obergefell 
rely on the “bathroom myth: the idea that if trans people are legally allowed to use the 
bathroom that corresponds to their gender identity, men will take advantage of the law to 
enter women’s bathrooms to harass and sexually assault women,” and the lack of evidence 
that nondiscrimination laws increase assaults. German Lopez, HB2, North Carolina’s 
sweeping anti-LGBTQ law, explained, Vox (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/2/23/11100552/charlotte-north-carolina-lgbtq-pat-mccrory; 
Sarah Posner, Anti-Trans Bathroom Debate:  How a Local Religious-Right Faction 
Launched a National Movement, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/how-houstons-religious-right-launched-the-anti-
lgbtq-bathroom-movement-w515477 (describing North Carolina values being inspired by 
Houston’s anti-HERO ads depicting a “young girl in a bathroom stall, with a chilling 
voiceover warning that a man could enter at any time”); Kathy Miller & Lisa Scheps, The 
Lies Behind Texas Anti-Abortion Laws and “Bathroom Bills,” TEXAS TRIBUNE (July 20, 
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At a time when our country finds itself more divided, and our politics more 
partisan, than ever,262 party leaders, concerned that the ordinary sunlight of 
committee hearings and floor debates will frustrate or scuttle their plans, 
increasingly choose to dispense with ordinary procedural requirements to pursue 
highly partisan goals.263 Many of these laws target “discrete and insular” groups—
African-American voters,264 Muslim foreign nationals,265 transgender 
                                                 
2017), https://www.tribtalk.org/2017/07/20/the-lies-behind-texas-anti-abortion-laws-and-
bathroom-bills/ (criticizing the “buzzwords” of private, safety, and protecting girls as 
“based on total lies”). 
262 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011) (describing the 
structural causes behind the rise of extreme partisan polarization); The Partisan Divide on 
Political Values Grows Even Wider, Pew Res. Ctr. (Oct 5, 2017), https://www.people-
press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/ 
(“divisions between Republicans and Democrats on fundamental political values . . . 
reached record levels during Barack Obama’s presidency. In Donald Trump’s first year as 
president, these gaps have grown even larger.”); Partisanship and Political Animosity in 
2016, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 22, 2016), http://www.people-
press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/ (“Partisans’ views of 
the opposing party are now more negative than at any point in nearly a quarter of a 
century.”). 
263 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 257 (5th ed. 2016) (“In recent Congresses, party leaders 
have perceived the circumstances to be ‘extraordinary’ considerably more frequently than 
in the past, in part at least because the high partisan polarization makes the crafting of 
legislation that can pass the chamber a more delicate political task.”). While the extent of 
procedural irregularity may be more pronounced than ever, it is not entirely a new 
phenomenon.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 223 (1986) 
(“We live in a time of widespread dissatisfaction with the legislative outcomes generated 
by the political process. Too often the process seems to serve only the purely private 
interests of special interest groups at the expense of the broader public interest it was 
ostensibly designed to serve.”). 
264 See supra notes 57-96 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 141-172 and accompanying text. 
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individuals.266 Others target much larger swaths of the polity—Democrats,267 Blue 
State liberals,268 consumers of health care.269 As legislators shrug off ordinary 
                                                 
266 Kevin M. Barry, et. al., A Bare Desire to Harm:  Transgender People and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507 (2016) (arguing that transgender people are a quasi-
suspect or suspect class, and thus transgender classifications warrant heightened scrutiny); 
S. Elizabeth Malloy, What Best to Protect Transsexuals from Discrimination:  Using 
Current Legislation or Adopting a New Judicial Framework, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
283 (2011) (analyzing the viability of current discrimination laws for protecting 
transgender individuals and concluding that a new category should be developed); Vittoria 
L. Buzzelli, Transforming Transgender Rights in Schools:  Protection from Discrimination 
Under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 187 (2016) 
(asserting transgender persons should receive protection as a quasi-suspect class); Anthony 
R. Enriquez, Note, Assuming Responsibility for Who You Are: The Right to Choose 
“Immutable” Identity Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2013) (arguing for application 
of heightened scrutiny to transgender individuals despite the so-called mutability of the 
characteristic); Isaac Saidel-Goley, Note, Romer v. Evans and House Bill 2: Déjà Vu All 
Over Again, 38 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 23 (2016) (arguing that heightened scrutiny should 
apply to transgender classifications, however animus-motivated laws, like HB-2, fail even 
under rational basis review). 
267 See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 597 (M.D.N.C. 2018) 
(invalidating redistricting plan motivated by a desire not “to advance any democratic or 
constitutional interest” but merely “to advantage Republican candidates”); Whitford v. 
Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 890 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding as unconstitutional a partisan 
gerrymandering plan intended “to secure the Republican Party’s control of the state 
legislature”). 
268 See Michael C. Dorf, The New Tax Law Punishes Blue States:  Is That 
Constitutional?, VERDICT (Dec. 27, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/12/27/new-tax-
law-punishes-blue-states-constitutional (examining the constitutionality of targeting 
particular states through the tax legislation); see also Eric Schnurer, War on the Blue States:  
The Republican Tax Bill is an Assault on the Cultural and Economic Foundation of Liberal 
America, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-
jefferson-street/articles/2017-12-01/gop-tax-bill-declares-war-on-blue-states (criticizing 
the tax bill’s elimination of the state and local tax deductions, which are notably high in 
blue states); see also Sasha Abramsky, The GOP Tax Bill was a Deliberate Attack on Blue 
States—And California Plans to Fight Back, THE NATION (Jan. 6, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-gop-tax-bill-was-a-deliberate-attack-on-blue-
states-and-california-plans-to-fight-back/ (describing the impact of the tax bill on blue 
states and discussing strategies to reduce it). 
269 Shortly after the 2016 election, Republicans immediately pursued two bills to 
overhaul Obamacare, doing most of their work outside the ordinary process, operating in 
secret and deliberately bypassing a number of ordinary congressional procedures. Matt 
O’Brien, Why Republicans were in Such a Hurry on Health Care, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/25/why-republicans-
were-in-such-a-hurry-on-health-care/?utm_term=.833a336951ed (attributing the first 
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protocols with greater frequency, passing laws at breakneck speed on expedited 
timelines, deliberately shutting out dissenting voices and consultation with outside 
experts and prohibiting open floor deliberation, the need for judicial protection 
may increase—especially when such concerns appear to reveal a hidden motive to 
exclude or punish an already vulnerable group. In addressing those concerns, 
process scrutiny provides important tools to complement other constitutional 




Process scrutiny could be both promising and dangerous for the protection 
of civil rights. On the one hand, underrepresented groups that lack majoritarian 
political gains may find it helpful to raise procedural malfunction as part of a larger 
strategy for helping courts understand their claim to substantive protection. While 
it is nearly impossible to prove that a law is “irrational,” or that a law that burdens 
a particular community is so devoid of rationality that it can only be grounded in 
animus, using procedural malfunction as a proxy for motivation may restore more 
fully protective possibilities that are obscured under more traditional rights 
doctrines. On the other hand, as Hawaii indicates, the converse can be also true: 
the political branches’ ability to demonstrate reasonable compliance with 
established procedural norms can be meaningful, if not dispositive, to avoiding the 
taint, or proving the absence, of improper intent. And, as Masterpiece Cakeshop 
                                                 
rushed health care vote to awareness of the plan’s unpopularity); Emma Talkoff, The GOP 
Complained About How Obamacare was Passed.  Now They’re Rushing Their Own Bill, 
TIME (June 21, 2017), http://time.com/4827115/health-care-bill-senate-republicans-
obamacare-criticism/ (comparing the processes behind Obamacare and the Republican 
efforts to repeal it). The House blazed through markups and held a vote before the 
Congressional Budget Office could complete its own study. To avoid the negative publicity 
garnered by the House bill, a group of thirteen senators met in total secret to draft the Senate 
legislation. See Dylan Scott, The Senate GOP’s Plan to Repeal Obamacare:  Don’t Let 
Anyone See Their Bill, VOX (June 13, 2017, at 11:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2017/6/13/15785332/senate-republicans-health-care-bill-secret. Nine 
Republican senators voted against a broad repeal, citing various substantive concerns, and 
while Senator John McCain had supported the package, he complained of the “secretive 
process” that led to it. Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Votes Down Broad 
Obamacare Repeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/us/politics/senate-health-care.html. Three days 
later, he provided the dramatic thumbs down to the “skinny repeal,” again “agitated over 
the rushed” process. MJ Lee, Cryptic Calls, Lip-Reading and a Thumbs-Down:  Behind 
McCain’s Dramatic Vote, CNN POLITICS (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/behind-mccain-health-care-vote/index.html.  
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shows, deployment of this form of procedural review will not always guarantee 
protections for the most vulnerable and politically powerless. 
To be sure, laws invalidated on a process-based theory could potentially 
(though not always) be reenacted through more ordinary procedures. And giving 
the courts the final word on process could imply ceding much of the ground of 
substance to the political branches, which many scholars (and some judges) will 
find worrisome. But during times of heightened partisan rancor and division, when 
rights are subject to whimsical or unpredictable infringements, process scrutiny 
has an obvious attraction.  A renewed attention to clear, objective evidence of 
adherence to process in judicial review could renew a sense of legitimacy among 
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